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NOTE 
UNITED STATES v. COVARRUBIAS: 
DOES THE NINTH CIRCUIT 




In 1991, the United States Supreme Court in McNeil v. 
Wisconsin 1. held that the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution right to counsel is offense specific.2 The 
offense specific requirement prohibits government initiated 
interrogation regarding an offense to which the right to coun-
sel has attached.3 However, many federal circuit and state 
1 See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991). 
2 
See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175. The McNeil court relied on Maine IJ. Moulton, 474 
U.S. 159, 179-180 (1985) in recognizing that the police have an interest in investigat-
ing new or additional crimes. See id. at 175-176. The McNeil court then reasoned that 
to exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was obtained, simply because other 
charges were pending at that time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest 
in the investigation of criminal activities. See id. at 176. Furthermore, the McNeil 
Court maintained that any departure from the offense specific nature of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel would have the unacceptable entailment that most per-
sons in pretrial custody for serious offenses would be unapproachable by police officers 
suspecting them of involvement in other crimes, even though they have never ex-
pressed any unwillingness to be questioned. See id. at 181. 
3 See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175. The McNeil court explained that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel is offense specific because this right does not attach until the 
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. See id. To hold otherwise would seriously 
impede effective law enforcement. See id. at 181. The Sixth Amendment states, in 
1 
1
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courts recognize two exceptions to the offense specific require-
ment.4 First, the offense specific requirement does not apply if 
the two offenses are inextricably intertwined such that the 
right to counsel for the pending charge cannot constitutionally 
be isolated from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense.5 
Second, the offense specific requirement does not apply if the 
government breaches its affirmative obligation not to act in a 
manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection 
afforded by the right to counsel. 6 Based on these two excep-
pertinent part: "The accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of counsel 
for his defence." See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
4 See Taylor v. Florida, 726 So.2d 841, 844-845 (lst Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1341-1342 (lOth Cir. 1991); United States v. Melgar, 139 
F.3d 1005, 1013-15 (4th Cit. 1998); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37,41-42 (3d Cir. 
1997); United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1991); Whittlesey v. 
Maryland, 665 A.2d 223,236 (Md. 1995); People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 451-453 
(TIl. 1988); United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1109-1110 (11th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-258 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1993). 
5 See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-744 (5th Cir. 1991) (uncharged 
federal offense of unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm was not inextricably 
intertwined with pending state charge of armed robbery); United States v. Hines, 963 
F.2d 255, 257-258 (9th Cir. 1992) (uncharged federal offense of firearms not inextrica-
bly intertwined with same state offense); United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th 
Cir. 1993) (series of cocaine sales were not inextricably intertwined with the cocaine 
sale that post-dated arraignment); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 41-42 (3d Cir. 
1997) (intimidation of witness was closely related with attempted murder of the same 
witness); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104-1105 (9th Cir. 1992) (interstate 
flight to avoid prosecution was not inextricably intertwined with murder); United 
States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33, 37-38 (lst Cir. 1988) (the federal crime of distributing 
or conspiring to distribute cocaine was not inextricably intertwined with earlier state 
charges of possession of marijuana); United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740-741 
(5th Cir. 1992) (the firearm charge was not inextricably intertwined with burglary 
charge); United Sates v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1341-1342 (10th Cir. 1991) (wit-
ness tampering was closely related with charged MDMA accounts); United States v. 
Walker, 148 F.3d 518, 529-530 (5th Cir. 1998) (suborning of perjury was not inextrica-
bly intertwined with the charged possession of firearm offense); People v. Clankie, 530 
N.E.2d 448, 451-453 (Ill. 1988) (three burglary offenses were inextricably intertwined). 
6 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (l985). If the federal and state authori-
ties worked together in shuffiing the defendant's charge from the state to the federal 
system, the defendant may suppress evidence based on the circumvention of right 
exception. See United States v. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 1992). See also 
United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-1343 (lOth Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1013-1015 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 
37, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1991); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 
974 F.2d 1099, 1104-1105 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-
2
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tions, many defendants claim that their incriminating state-
ments regarding a prospective charge should be suppressed.7 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed one such challenge in United States v. Covarrubias.s 
In Covarrubias, the Ninth Circuit held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attached only to Covarrubias' and 
Ochoa's state kidnapping offense, not the federal crime of 
transporting an illegal alien.9 Thus, the government was pro-
hibited from initiating an interrogation concerning the state 
kidnapping offense. lo Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held 
that, because the crime of kidnapping and transporting illegal 
aliens were inextricably intertwined, the statements made to 
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (here-
inafter, "I.N.S.") Agent Gonzalez must be suppressed.ll 
In Part II, this Note discusses Covarrubias' facts and proce-
dural history. Part III outlines the history of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, with an emphasis on the inextri-
cably intertwined exception. Part IV analyzes the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Covarrubias. Part V critiques this reasoning 
in light of the strong presumption against the finding of the 
application of the inextricably intertwined exception. Finally, 
Part VI concludes that the Ninth Circuit properly suppressed 
258 (9th Cir. 1992); People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 451-452 (Dl. 1988); Whittlesey 
v. Maryland, 665 A.2d 223, 235 (Md. 1995); United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 
F.2d 1099, 1109-1110 (11th Cir. 1990); Taylor f. Florida, 726 So. 2d 841, 844 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
7 
See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
s 
See United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999). The appeal from 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington was argued 
and submitted March 9, 1999 before Circuit Judge William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judge 
Stephen R. Reinhardt and Circuit Judge Sidney R. Thomas. The decision was filed on 
June 14, 1999. Circuit Judge Reinhardt authored the opinion. 
9 
See id. at 1223. The right to counsel attached to the state kidnapping charge at 
the defendants' preliminary hearing, when adversarial judicial proceedings had been 




See id. at 1226. The Ninth Circuit did not consider the second exception, the cir-
cumvention of the Sixth Amendment right, because either exception provides an inde-
pendent basis for suppressing evidence. See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226. 
3
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the defendant's incriminating statements obtained by I.N.S. 
Agent Gonzalez, but would have set forth a stronger position 
had the Ninth Circuit evaluated in addition, or, in the alterna-
tive, under the circumvention of right exception. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On December 18, 1997, defendants Covarrubias and Ochoa 
drove eight individuals, some of whom may have been un-
documented immigrants, from Los Angeles, California to 
Washington state in Covarrubias' van in return for payment.12 
Due to a dispute over money, Covarrubias and Ochoa dropped 
everyone off in Washington except Hernandez.13 Subsequently, 
Hernandez's wife contacted the police and told them that the 
Covarrubias and Ochoa held Hernandez for ransom. 14 The po-
lice supplied Mrs. Hernandez with $700.00 of marked currency 
to meet the ransom demands. 15 When Mrs. Hernandez handed 
over the marked currency to Covarrubias and Ochoa, the police 
arrested them. 16 
Aware that Hernandez was in the United States illegally, 
the officers at Sunnyside Police Department had previously 
enlisted the services of I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez. 17 At the Sun-
12 
See id. at 1221. 
13 
See id. Apparently, the defendants called Mrs. Hernandez who was in Sunnyside 
and told her that they were transporting her husband. See Brief for Appellant at 8, 
United States v. Covarrubias, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defen-
dant's Motion to Suppress (No. CA-98-30167). 
The defendants forced Mr. Hernandez back into Covarrubias' van once Mrs. Her-
nandez was unable to pay. See id. 
14 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221. The Ninth Circuit believed that the police had 
reason to believe that Hernandez was being held against his will because Hernandez's 
wife told the police that the defendants were holding him for ransom. See id, 
15 
See id. With Hernandez's wife's cooperation, the Sunnyside police officers exe-
cuted a plan to apprehend the defendants. See id. The police gave her $700 to give to 
the defendants so that she could retrieve her husband. See id. 
16 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221. 
17 
See id. The State argued that although Agent Gonzalez participated in the plan-
ning of the arrest and the arrest itself, it did not necessarily indicate collusion between 
the state and federal agents, since the I.N.S. agents frequently assist the Sunnyside 
4
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nyside Police Department, Detective Jose Trevino questioned 
Covarrubias while Officer Jarin WhitelylS questioned Ochoa 
regarding the kidnapping charge.19 Covarrubias and Ochoa 
made incriminating statements regarding both the pending 
kidnapping and the federal illegal transportation charges.2o 
After the interviews, the defendants were transported to the 
Yakima County Jai1.21 
The following day, December 19, 1997, Covarrubias and 
Ochoa appeared for a preliminary hearing on the state kidnap-
ping charge before the Superior Court of the State of Washing-
ton.22 The court appointed counsel for both defendants.23 Later 
that day, I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez visited Yakima County Jail to 
interview the defendants upon reading both defendants their 
Miranda rights.24 Both defendants waived their Miranda 
Police Department and go to the Sunnyside jail every day. See Appellants' Brief at 19-
20, Covarrubias (No. CA-98-30167). 
is 
It should be noted that the District Court used the name "Officer Whitby," 
whereas the Ninth Circuit used the name "Officer Whitely:' It appears that the two 
names refer to the same person. For ease of reference, Officer Whitely will be used 
hereafter. 
19 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221. 
20 
See id. at 1221 n.2, n.1. The police asked who the van belonged to, how the de-
fendants came to Sunnyside (which Covarrubias answered by explaining his agree-
ment to transport Hernandez and the financial arrangement that was made), how 
many other individuals were transported to Washington State, whether Hernandez 
was detained against his will, and the nationality of the individuals involved in trans-
porting. See id. at n.2. Covarrubias and Ochoa told the police officers that Covarrubias 
and Ochoa claimed that Hernandez's wife was supposed to meet them with $900, $200 
of which was to pay them for the ride and the remainder of which was to reimburse 
them for a $700 payment they made on Hernandez's behalf to the people who had 
brought him across the Mexican border. See id. at n.1. 
21 
See id. at 1222. 
22 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222. To be guilty of the state offense of First De-
gree Kidnapping, a person must intentionally abduct another person with the intent to 
hold him for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage. See Revised Code of Wash-
ington 9A.040.020. 
23 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222. 
24 
See id. The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." See U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. In interpreting the Fifth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the Fifth Amendment requires government officials during a custodial inter-
rogation to warn a defendant that he or she has a right to remain silent, right to the 
5
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rights.25 Then, Gonzalez proceeded to interrogate Covarrubias 
and Ochoa regarding the potential federal charge of trans-
porting illegal aliens and the state kidnapping charge.26 
On February 5, 1998, the state dismissed without prejudice 
its criminal kidnapping charges against Covarrubias and 
Ochoa because of an alleged promise of federal prosecution for 
charges arising out of the same incident.27 On March 3, 1998, 
Covarrubias and Ochoa were indicted with two federal 
charges: transporting and moving an illegal alien in violation 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a) (1) (B) and forfeiture. 28 
presence of attorney whether retained or appointed, and that any statement may be 
used as evidence against him or her in order to preserve the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). There-
fore, the Fifth Amendment limits the government's ability to use defendant's self in-
criminating statements as evidence in a criminal proceeding. See Moran v. Burbine, 
. 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). In order for these statements to be admissible, these state-
ments must be made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. See id. Further, a de-
fendant's invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during judicial proceed-
ing does not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel derived by Miranda v. 
Arizona, from the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled self-incrimination. 
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 175-182 (1985). 
25 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221-1222. The district court made a specific find-
ing that both defendants voluntarily waived their Miranda rights to the Sunnyside 
police officers and I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in 
Part Defendants' Motion to Suppress at 3-5, United States v. Covarrubias (No. CR-98-
2030-RHW, No. CR-98-2031-RHW). 
26. . 
See CovarrubUJ8, 179 F.3d at 1222 n.4. I.N.S. While the defendants were formally 
charged with a kidnapping offense, I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez asked questions about the 
defendants' immigration status, their transporting of other illegal immigrants to 
Washington state and the financial arrangements for the trip, the defendants' prior 
experience with transporting illegal immigrants, their knowledge of the immigration 
status of the individuals they were transporting, what had happened regarding Her-
nandez's inability to pay, whether Hernandez had been forced to remain in the van 
against his will, what statements the defendants had made to Hernandez, and 
whether Hernandez had been kidnapped for ransom. See id. Although I.N.S. Agent 
Gonzalez argued that he was not aware that the defendants had been arraigned and 
counsel had been appointed, the court imputed knowledge to Agent Gonzalez, given 
his experience, that he was aware that the defendants had been arraigned and coun-
sel had been appointed. See id. at 1222 n .. 3. 
27 
See id. at 1222. Agent Gonzalez denied any promise of federal prosecution. See 
Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222 n.5. 
28 
See id. at 1222. The Ninth Circuit addressed only the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel claim. See id. 
8 U.S.C. § 1321 (a)(I)(8) states, in pertinent part: 
6
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On or about April 10, 1998, Covarrubias and Ochoa brought 
a motion to suppress the statements made to Officer Whitley 
and Detective Trevino.29 Additionally, the defendants sought to 
suppress their statements made to I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez.30 
Both motions alleged Fifth Amendment,31 Sixth Amendment,32 
and Vienna Convention violations.33 At the close of the eviden-
tiary hearing on May 22, 1998, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Washington rejected the de-
fendant's Fifth Amendmene4 and Vienna Convention claims.35 
Further, the district court denied the motion to suppress the 
A person who violates (A) shall, for each alien be fined under title 18, 
United States Co~e. (A) Criminal penalties apply to any person who 
knows that a person is an alien, knowingly brings to or attempts to 
bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever ... knowing or in 
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or 
remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or moves 
or attempts to transport or move such alien with the United States by 
means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation 
of law; knowing or in reckless disregard ... conceals, harbors, or shields 
from detection .. .including any builder or any means of transportation; 
encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the 
United States, knowing or in reckless disregard will be in violation of 
law; or engages in any conspiracy to commit any order of the preceding 
acts, or aids and abets the commission. 
29 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222. 
30 
See id. at 1222-1223. 
31 . 
See supra note 24 and accompanYing text. 
32 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222-1223. The Sixth Amendment states, in perti-
nent part: "The accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence." See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
33 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222-1223. Ochoa also argued that all of his state-
ments must be suppressed because the investigating officers violated the Vienna con-
vention by not advising him of his right to consult with Mexican consular officials. See 
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part at 6, Covarrubias (No. CR-98-2030-RHW, 
No. CR-98-2031-RHW). Article 36 of the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations, 
which states that a citizen of a party-State who is arrested by authorities of another 
party-State shall be advised of the right to consult with consular officials. See 21 
U.S.T. 77, Art. 36. 
34 
See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part at 7-8, Covarrubias (No. CR-98-
2030-RHW, No. CR-98-2031-RHW). 
35 
See id. at 12-13. Relying on [n re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights 
Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992), the district court held that treaty-created 
rights are not enforceable by individuals unless they are either the subject of the im-
plementing legislation or are deemed self executing, and therefore, the district court 
denied Ochoa's motion to suppress because Ochoa points to no implementing statute 
or regulation that would make the treaty effective. See id. 
7
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statements made to Officer Whitely and Detective Trevino, 
who were investigating the state kidnapping offense.36 
However, the district court found that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel had attached to the state kidnapping 
charge.37 As a result, the district court granted the motion to 
suppress only statements regarding the violation of the Sixth 
Amendment regarding the federal charge of transporting ille-
gal aliens.3s Accordingly, the district court suppressed the in-
criminating statements made to I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez con-
cerning the defendants' transportation of illegal aliens from 
California to Washington.39 
On May 28, 1998, the government filed an interlocutory ap-
peal.40 Under review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
crime of kidnapping and the federal transporting charges were 
inextricably intertwined.41 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit af-
36 . 
See Covarrub/.a8, 179 F.3d at 1222-1223. See also supra notes 25, 33 and accom-
panying text. 
37 
See Order Granting in Part and Denying at 8, Covarrubias (No. CR-98-2030-
RHW, No. CR-98-2031-RHW). "It is not disputed that Defendants' Sixth Amendment 
rights to counsel had attached and were invoked when they were appointed counsel 
during their preliminary hearings." [d. 
38 
See id. The district court acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment right is of-
fense specific. See id. at 9-10. The court concluded that the two exceptions to this rule 
caused the right to counsel to extend to the federal charges because 1) federal trans-
porting charges was so inextricably intertwined with the state kidnapping charge; and 
2) by questioning the defendants, who had been arrested and charged as a result of a 
joint state-federal effort, the federal government had acted to circumvent the defen-
dants' right to counsel. See id. 
39 
See Order Granting in Part and Denying at 13-14, Covarrubias (No. CR-98-2030-
RHW, No. CR-98-2031-RHW). 
40 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223. See also Notice of Appeal at 1, United States 
v. Covarrubias (No. 98-30167). 
41 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226. For clarity, closely related, extremely closely 
related and inextricably intertwined all apparently seem to refer to the same excep-
tion. See id. at 1223 (using closely related and inextricably intertwined interchangea-
bly); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E. 2d 1218, 1223 (Mass. 1997) (characteriz-
ing closely related and inextricably intertwined as "two terms which we take to mean 
the same thing"); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1011 (4th Cir. 1998) (using 
closely related and inextricably intertwined interchangeably); United States v. Arnold, 
106 F.3d 37, 40-41 (3rd Cir. 1997) (characterizing closely related and inextricably 
intertwined as "two terms which we take to mean the same thing."); United States v. 
8
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firmed the district court's ruling that ordered suppression of 
the incriminating statements. 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the right to have assistance of counsel in all crimi-
nal prosecutions.42 In addition, the Sixth Amendment affords a 
defendant the right to rely on counsel as a medium between 
the defendant and the State.43 The United States Supreme 
Court views the right to counsel as indispensable to the fair 
administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice.44 
However, the Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees the right 
to counsel only upon the initiation of formal charges.45 
Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1992) (extremely closely related used along 
with inextricably intertwined). 
42 
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for ob-
taining witness in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." [d. 
43 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985). The Powell court was the first 
mejor case where the United States Supreme Court discussed the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). 
44 
See generally Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986); Moulton, 474 U.S. at 
170; Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,687 (1972); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 
(1977); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293, 308 (1966); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 344-345, (1963); Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69 (1932); Massiah v United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). "In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and suc-
ceeding cases requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to 
determine whether the presence of counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's 
basic right to a fair trail as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the 
witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself." 
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). 
45 See Moran, 475 U.S. at 431. For a discussion of the purpose and meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First 
Principles, 84 GEO. L. J. 641, 705-711 (1996); Charles E. Torcia, 3 Wharton's Criminal 
9
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In Kirby v. Illinois,46 the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only 
at or immediately after the initiation of an adversarial judicial 
proceeding whether by way of formal charge, preliminary 
hearing, indictment, information or arraignment.47 The Kirby 
court reasoned that once a person stands formally accused of a 
crime, he or she is vulnerable to certain critical stages in the 
criminal justice process where the results if which might well 
settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere 
formality:8 Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel ex-
tends to all critical stages of the criminal proceedings between 
the accused and the forces of the government.49 Once the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches, any subsequent waiver 
during a police-initiated custodial interview is presumptively 
ineffective. 50 Furthermore, deliberate elicitation of incriminat-
Procedure, §§ 364-374, at 239-244 (13th ed. 1991 & We8t Supp. 1997) (discussing the 
right to counsel). 
46 
See 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
47 
See id. at 687-688. The Kirby plumlity held that its test encompassed all prior cases in which 
the Court had found a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. These cases included Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. I, 9-10 (1970) (plumlity opinion) (right to counsel attached at pre-indictment 
preliminary hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (right to counsel attached 
at post-indictment, pretrial lineup); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (right to 
counsel attached at post-indictment interrogation); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1961) 
(right to counsel attached at armignment); Moore v. Dlinois, 434 U.S. 220, 229-31 (1977) (right to 
counsel attached for in-person identification at preliminary hearing because critical stage of prose-
cution); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 40 I (1977) (right to counsel attached at interrogation 
after armignment because adversarial proceedings had begun). 
48 
See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688-689. The Court explained that a person is entitled to 
counsel once "the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified, 
where the government is not longer investigatory but accusatory." See id. 
49 
See Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-237. The Wade court defined a critical stage in the 
criminal justice process as "where the results might well settle the accused's fate and 
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality" or where there is a "potential substantial 
prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability 
of right to counsel to help avoid prejudice." See id. at 224,227. 
50 
See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986). After the accused has re-
quested counsel, the government may no longer question the defendant unless the 
defendant initiates a conversation with the government. See id. It is incumbent upon 
the State to prove "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege." See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The strict standard applies 
equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical 
stage of pretrial proceedings. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-237. The Wade Court ruled 
that a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel not only requires comprehen-
10
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ing evidence from an accused after the right to counsel at-
taches violates the Sixth Amendment.51 Therefore, any state-
ments obtained in violation of a defendant's right to counsel 
are inadmissible.52 
In i964, Massiah v. United States53 marked the first in-
stance in which the United States Supreme Court required the 
exclusion of evidence based on a violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. 54 In Massiah, the defendant, Massiah, 
made incriminating statements to a co-defendant, who had 
placed a hidden radio transmitter under the front his automo-
bile.55 The United States Supreme Court excluded Massiah's 
incriminating statements concerning pending charges surrepti-
tiously coaxed by the government in the absence of counsel. 56 
sion but also a relinquishment. See id. at 237. The United States Supreme Court has 
afforded a presumption against an implied waiver of counsel because this right is 
indispensable to the fair administration of justice. See id. Furthermore, the United 
States Supreme Court has held that a valid waiver only exists when it is a product of 
free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception, and when 
the waiver is made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being aban-
doned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. See id. 
51 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964). The United States Su-
preme Court concluded that the need for counsel applied equally in an extra-judicial 
setting as at the trial itself. See id. 
52 
See MOS8iah, 377 U.S. at 204. 
53 
See 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
54 
See id. at 206. "We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of 
[the Sixth Amendment right to counsel] when there was used against him at his trial 
evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited 
form him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." See id. at 204. 
The MOS8iah court explained that the adversarial system and that the Sixth Amend-
ment contemplated a defendant aided trial by counsel. See id. 
55 • • 
See id. at 202-203. Masslah and co-defendant Colson had been charged for a co-
caine offense. MOS8iah, 377 U.S. at 202-203. Both were released on bail. See id. Col-
son later agreed to cooperate with the police. See id. Unbeknownst to Massiah, Mas-
. siah made incriminating statements to Colson. See id. Thus, the Sixth Amendment 
prohibits government-initiated interrogation even if it is indirect and surreptitious. 
See id. 
56 
See MOS8iah, 377 U.S. at 206-207. Massiah's Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attached when he was arraigned and subsequently indicted for possession of narcotics 
aboard a United States vessel. See id. at 202. The United States Supreme Court rea-
soned that the police had deliberately elicited incriminating evidence through Colson 
as the government's informant without the presence of counsel because Massiah had 
no idea that he was under an interrogation by a government agent. See id. When the 
11
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Consequently, the government may not deliberately elicit in-
criminating evidence from the accused without the presence 
counsel for an offense to which the Sixth Amendment has al-
ready attached. 57 
Moreover, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not 
attach to other and different charges against the same defen-
dant because the right to counsel is offense specific. 58 In 
McNeil v. Wisconsin,59 the defendant, McNeil, admitted his 
involvement in murder, attempted murder and armed burglary 
charges to a sheriff after being formally charged with armed 
robbery.60 The United States Supreme Court held that the gov-
ernment did not violate McNeil's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. 61 Hence, once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
government deliberately elected incriminating 8tatements from Massiah, it amounted 
to a denial of the "basic protections" of the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 206. 
57 
See id. at 207. For criticisms of the reasoning behind the Massiah exclusionary 
rule, Edwin Meese III, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40 VAND. L. REV. 271,276-
281 (1987); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A 
Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1137, 
1154-95 (1987). 
58 See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). See also Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 308 (1966). Hoffa's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached 
concerning his prosecution for violation of the Taft-Hartley Act. See id. at 294. The 
United States Supreme Court reasoned that Hoffa's statements related to the·commis-
sion of a separate offense, attempted bribery of jurors, which had no connection with 
the legitimate defense of the Test Fleet prosecution. See id. 308. See also Dlinois v. 
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990). Perkins had made incriminating statements of murder 
to an undercover informant cellmate. See id. at 294. The United States Supreme Court 
found no Sixth Amendment violation since Perkins had made incriminating state-
ments voluntarily to an undercover cop regarding an uncharged offense. See id. at 299-
300. The United States Supreme Court further noted that the use of undercover 
agents is a recognized law enforcement technique often employed in the prison con-
text. See id. at 300. 
59 
See 501 U.S. 171 (1991). 
60 See id. at 174. A public defender represented McNeil at a bail hearing for an 
armed robbery charge in West Allis, Wisconsin. See id. at 173-174. While in jail on' 
that charge, the police questioned McNeil about a murder charge in Caledonia, Wis-
consin. See id. at 174. The police advised McNeil of his Miranda rights, McNeil signed 
forms waiving them, and made statements incriminating himself in the Caledonia 
offenses. See id. McNeil was then formally charged with the latter offense. See McNeil, 
501 U.S. at 174. 
61 See id. at 181-182. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that because 
McNeil made statements with respect to the Caledonia offenses before the Sixth 
12
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attaches to a specific offense, it cannot be invoked once for all 
future prosecutions for it does not attach until a prosecution 
has commenced.62 Accordingly, the government does not violate 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if evidence is obtained 
without deliberate elicitation or through luck or happenstance 
regarding an offense to which the Sixth Amendment has not 
yet attached.63 Thus, incriminating statements obtained by the 
government pertaining to other crimes where the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel has not attached may be used in a 
subsequent trial of those crimes.64 
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE OFFENSE SPECIFIC RULE 
Courts have developed two exceptions to the offense specific 
requirement.65 First, the offense specific requirement does not 
apply when the subsequent uncharged offense is inextricably 
intertwined with the charged offense.66 The exception focuses 
on whether the facts underlying the charged and uncharged 
offenses are identical. 67 Second, the offense specific require-
Amendment had been invoked, and therefore, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred 
since the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached only to the armed robbery 
offense. See id. 
62 
See id. at 175. And just as the right is offense specific, so also its Michigan v. 
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,636 (1986) effect of invalidating subsequent waivers in police-
initiated interviews is offense specific. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 
(1984). 
63 
See Maine v. Moultan, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985). Deliberate elicitation occurs 
when the government purposely seeks to obtain incriminating evidence from the ac-
cused, not when obtained by luck or happenstance. See id. The term interrogation 
refers to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. See Spano v. 
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-322 (1959). 
64 . 
See McNe,l, 501 U.S. at 174-175. 
~ . 
See supra notes 4-6 and accompanymg text. 
66 
See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
67 
See Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E. 2d 1218, 1224 n.5 (Mass. 1997). The 
Rainwater court stated, "the more extensive line of cases focuses entirely on whether 
the facts underlying the charged and uncharged offenses are either closely related or 
inextricably intertwined." See id. at 1224. The Rainwater court noted that the inextri-
cably intertwined exception is a narrow exception. See id. The Rainwater court relied 
13
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ment does not apply when the government breaches its af-
firmative obligation not to circumvent the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. 68 Courts construe this exception more broadly 
than the inextricably intertwined exception where there is evi-
dence that the police deliberately sought to circumvent the 
prohibition of questioning in respect to the charged offense.69 
The circumvention of right exception allows for the suppres-
sion of incriminating evidence when the formal and subse-
quent charge arose from the same course of conduct.70 
1. Inextricably Intertwined Exception 
The inextricably intertwined exception prohibits the gov-
ernment from initiating an interrogation with regard to the 
uncharged offense if the formal charge and subsequent charge 
are closely related. 71 The United States Supreme Court implic-
itly endorsed the inextricably intertwined exception in Brewer 
v. Williams72 and Maine v. Moulton.73 
In Brewer, the defendant, Robert Williams, abducted a ten-
year-old girl after he escaped from a mental hospital in Iowa.74 
Williams' attorneys advised him not to say anything to the po-
lice without the presence of counsel. 75 The police officers agreed 
not to interrogate Williams during a long automobile drive to 
on Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 53-54 (Md. 1996) in observing the development of 
the two exceptions. See id. at 1224 n.5. 
68 
See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
69 See Rainwater, 681 N.E. 2d at 1223. 
70 
See United States v. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 1992); Rainwater, 
681 N.E.2d at 1223-1224 n.5 (Mass. 1997); United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 
1329, 1342 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1013-1014 (4th 
Cir. 1998); Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 53-54 (Md. 1995). 
71 
See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
72 
See 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
73 
See 474 U.S. 159 (1985). 
74 
See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 390. 
75 See id. Williams called his attorney at Davenport who had advised Williams to 
confess his murder in Davenport. See id. Thus, the police officers drove Williams from 
Des Moines to Davenport where Williams' attorney advised William to turn himself ay 
Davenport which was about 160 miles away. See id. 
14
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Des Moines.76 Two officers drove Williams without the pres-
ence of counsel to Des Moines.77 During the trip, one of the offi-
cers, who knew Williams was a former mental patient and 
deeply religious, mentioned that the parents of the victim 
should be entitled to a Christian burial. 7S A short time later, 
still without the presence of counsel, Williams directed the of-
ficers to the location of the girl's body.79 The United States Su-
preme Court characterized the officer's action as purposely 
isolating Williams from his lawyers to obtain as much incrimi-
nating information as possible.so As a result, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the officer's actions clearly violated 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and suppressed Wil-
liam's statements concerning the murder charge.81 Though the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel formally attached only to 
the abduction charge, the United States Supreme Court ex-
tended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to statements 
relevant to the murder charge against Williams.82 
Similarly, in Maine v. Moulton the Court upheld the sup-
pression of statements for two different charges.s3 In Moulton, 
76 
See id. at 391. A Des Moines lawyer had previously informed officers there that 
he represented Williams. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 390. 
77 
See id. at 391. 
7S 




See id. at 399. 
S1 
See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404. It should be noted, however, that these proceedings 
concerned the abduction charge and not the later murder charge for which Williams 
was convicted. 
S2 
See id. at 404-406. The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's 
wavier of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was invalid and that the statements 
he made to the police identifying the body's location were, therefore, inadmissible. See 
id. 
S3 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985). The Moulton court explained 
that a knowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused 
without counsel being present is a breach of State's obligation not to circumvent the 
right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity. 
See id. at 176. Moulton court viewed the police recommendation of the use of body wire 
to Colson as intentionally creating a situation that they knew, or should have known, 
was likely to result in Moulton's making incriminating statements during his meeting 
with Colson. See id. at 168. 
15
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prosecutors indicted defendants Perley Moulton and Gary Col-
son on four counts of theft.84 Later, Colson confessed to his in-
volvement in the thefts and agreed to cooperate with the police 
in the prosecution of Moulton.85 Though the police knew that 
Moulton's right to counsel had attached to the theft charge, the 
police still suggested that Colson wear a hidden wire transmit-
ter and record a conversation between himself and Moulton.86 
The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment places an affirma-
tive obligation upon the government not to act in a manner 
that circumvents the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 87 Con-
sequently, the Court concluded that the police violated Moul-
ton's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 88 Therefore, the 
United States Supreme Court suppressed Moulton's state-
ments regarding the burglary but admitted evidence regarding 
Moulton's alleged plan to kill a witness.89 Thus, as Brewer and 
Moulton demonstrate, the United States Supreme Court has 
implied that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may attach 
84 
See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 162-163. On April 7, 1981, a Waldo County grand jury 
returned indictments charging Moulton and Colson with four counts of theft by re-
ceiving in violation of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 359 (1983). See id. It should be 
noted that Gary Colson, the co-defendant, has no relationship to Massiah's Colson. 
85 
See id. Colson gave full confessions of his participating with Moulton in commit-
ting the theft, and also admitted that he and Moulton broke into the local Ford dealer-
ship to steal the parts. See id. at 163. Colson also stated that he and Moulton had set 
fire to the dump truck and had committed other thefts. See id. The police told Colson 
that no additional charges would be brought against him in exchange for his help. See 
Moulton, 474 U.S. at 163. 
86 
See id. at 163. The police argued that they had a legitimate purpose: to record 
conversations regarding the killing of a witness. See id. at 178. In the process, the 
police obtained incriminating evidence regarding Moulton's burglary charge. See id. 
The United States Supreme Court did not find this persuasive in the wake of a know-
ing circumvention of Moulton's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. at 179. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed defendant's burglary conviction but allowed 
the possibility that the information could be used in a subsequent trial regarding the 
plan to kill the witness. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180. On the other hand, in a dissent 
by Justice Burger, he found the result bizarre, stating that the mlijority's decision 
turns the Sixth Amendment right to counsel into a magic cloak to protect criminals 
who engage in multiple offenses that are the subject of separate police investigations. 
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to other offenses that are closely related to the conduct that 
formed the basis for the initially charged crime.90 
The inextricably intertwined exception to the offense spe-
cific requirement has been recognized since 1988 in People v. 
Clankie.91 Relying on two prior United States Supreme Court 
decisions, the Clankie court concluded that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel that has attached to the formal charge 
also extends to a subsequent charge that is closely related.92 
In Clankie, the government charged Thomas Clankie with 
three separate counts of residential burglary.93 The Clankie 
court suppressed incriminating evidence recorded via wiretap 
because it violated Clankie's Sixth Amendment right to coun-
se1.94 The Clankie court determined that the inextricably inter-
twined exception applies when the two offenses are so similar 
that the right to counsel for the first offense can trigger the 
right to counsel for the subsequent offense.95 The Clankie court 
held that the three burglary offenses were closely related for 
two reasons.96 First, both defendants testified to the same 
course of conduct, the unlawful joint entry into the same vic-
tim's residence.97 Second, the burglaries involved the same 
house, same owner, and same time span.98 Though the Clankie 
90 
See generally Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180. 
91 
See 530 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. 1988). 
~ . . 
See id. at 450-452. The Clankie court relied on Brewer v. Williams and Maine v. 
Moulton, in recognizing the inextricably intertwined exception. See id. The Clankie 
court asserted that from these two Supreme Court cases, the United States Supreme 
Court assumes that "the Sixth Amendment rights of one formany charged with an 
offense extend to offenses closely related to that offense and for which a defendant is 
subsequently formally accused." See id. at 452. 
~. . 
See id. at 449. Clankie was charged by three separate counts of burglary under 
Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 19--3) where the defendant entered the dwelling place of 
J. F. McNeil. See Clankie, 530 N.E.2d at 449. 
94 
See id. at 453. 
95 See id. at 452-453. 
96 




See Clankie, 530 N.E.2d at 452. 
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court found that the charges were inextricably intertwined, it 
did not attempt to delineate the parameters as to when the 
inextricably intertwined exception applies.99 After Clankie, 
several federal circuit and state courts recognized the closely 
related exception and attempted to define its specific require-
ments. 100 However, no uniform standard has been applied. lol 
These courts have tried to cabin this unruly concept in one or 
more of the following tests.102 
a. Same Course of Conduct 
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that the inextricably 
intertwined exception applies if the charged and uncharged 
offenses involve the same course of conduct. 103 In United States 
v. Cooper,t°4 the Fifth Circuit first recognized the inextricably 
intertwined exception under the "same course of conduct" 
test.105 In Cooper, the prosecutors charged Clinton Cooper with 
aggravated robbery.l06 Six days later, a federal agent visited 
99 See id. The court acknowledged the closely related exception, but did not attempt 
to define a standard because all the crimes concerned the same offense of burglary 
that arose from the same course of conduct and factual predicate. See id. 
100 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. While it might appear that the United 
States Supreme Court's opinion in McNeil put an end to the inextricably intertwined 
exception because McNeil was decided after Clankie, the Fifth Circuit in United States 
v. Cooper acknowledged the same principle just six months after McNeil. See United 
States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-744 (5th Cir. 1991). 
101 See United States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33, 37-38 (lst Cir. 1988) (nulceii of opera-
tive fact); United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1993) (factual predicate 
test); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-258 (9th Cir. 1992) (time, place, per-
sons); United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-744 (5th Cir. 1991) (same course of 
conduct); United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-1343 (lOth Cir. 1991) 
(same evidence); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37-42 (3d Cir. 1997) (factual predi-
cate, conduct, intent and circumstances). 
102 
See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
103 See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-744 (5th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740-741 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Walker, 
148 F.3d 518, 529 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 776 n.32 
(6th Cir. 1997). 
104 See 949 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1991). 
105 
See id. at 743-744. 
106 See id at 740. Cooper was a suspect in a convenience store robbery in Mart, 
Texas. See id. The arresting officers conducted an inventory search of the car's con-
18
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Cooper in jail and interrogated him about possession of an un-
licensed firearm during the robbery.107 The prosecutors used 
information from the interrogation to subsequently charge 
Cooper with unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm. lOS 
The Fifth Circuit held that even though the two cases would 
utilize essentially the same evidence, the robbery predated the 
possession of a firearm, and therefore, the two charges were 
not closely related. 109 
The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the "same course of conduct" 
test later in United States v. Carpenter110 and United States v. 
Walker. lll In both cases, the court acknowledged the inextrica-
bly intertwined exception but found that the exception did not 
1 112 appy. 
In Carpenter, the officers arrested and charged James Car-
penter with burglary.ll3 The officers discovered a firearm and 
crack pipe on the back seat floorboard of the police cruiser 
where Carpenter had been placed to be transported to the 
county jail.114 While in custody, Carpenter confessed to Agent 
tents before turning the car over to the wrecker for towing to the station. See id. In the 
trunk they found a sawed-off shotgun. See Cooper, 949 F.2d at 740. The next day, the 




See id. at 740-741. Cooper was convicted for the federal crime of unlawful pos-
session of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C §§ 5845(a), 5861(d), and 
5871. See id. at 739. • 
109 See Cooper, 949 F.2d at 744. "Cooper's first claim, that his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel was violated when the federal agent question him about the robbery, 
is captious at best." [d. at 743. This court applied the analysis from People v. Clankie 
of whether or not two offenses were extremely closely related. See id. at 743-744. 
110 
See 963 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1992). 
III 
See 148 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1993). 
112 See Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 740-741 (firearm offense was not inextricably inter-
twined with burglary offense because they arose out of a different course of conduct: 
the burglary offense predated the firearm offense); Walker, 148 F.3d at 529-530 
(knowingly making false material declarations in front of a federal grand jury not 
inextricably intertwined with drug conspiracy because two offense involved different 
conduct and sovereigns). 
113 
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Redman that the gun and crack pipe belonged to him. 116 Sub-
sequently, Carpenter was charged in federal court with posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon. 116 Applying the "same 
course of conduct" analysis, the Fifth Circuit did not find that 
the firearm charge was inextricably intertwined with the bur-
glary offense because the burglary charge predated the firearm 
offense. 117 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit did not suppress Car-
penter's statements to Agent Redman. 11s 
In Walker, the court again declined to apply the inextricably 
intertwined exception based on the "same course of conduct" 
test. 119 In Walker, Jerry Lee Quinn detected the surveillance 
by Aberdeen Police Officer Pete Conwill and Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms Agent Joey Hall, and fled. 120 The police 
officers pursued a black and gold Pontiac Grand Am, which 
they believed to be driven by Quinn.121 Police Officer Conwill 
attempted to apprehend the driver at an impromptu roadblock 
and found the car empty.122 After impounding the Grand Am, 
the police found a loaded 9mm semiautomatic handgun in the 
backseat armrest. 123 Subsequently, the prosecutor charged 
116 See id. Agent Redman with the Bureau of Alcohol Firearms and Tobacco visited 
with Carpenter twice. See id. Redman received a report from the police department 
which indicted that Carpenter qualified as an armed career criminal. See id. Redman 
asked questioned solely about the firearm, advised Carpenter of his Miranda rights, 
and obtained signed waiver of his Miranda rights. Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 738. Carpen-
ter confessed that the gun and the crack pipe belonged to him. See id. 
116 • 
See id. at 739. 
117 
See id. at 741. "We do not find the firearm offense and the state burglary offense 
to be 'inextricably intertwined' or 'extremely closely related"" [d. at 740-741. The war-
rant for the burglary charge came before the events leading up to the rll'earm charge. 
See Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 741. Moreover, Carpenter does not even argue that the 
firearm was in any way linked to the burglary. See id. 
l1S 
See id. at 741. The Fifth Circuit relied on its Circuit's prior holding in Cooper, 
949 F.2d at 743-744 in finding that the inextricably intertwined exception applies if 
both offenses arise from the same course of conduct. See id. at 739-740. 
119 
See Walker, 148 F.3d at 529-530. 
120 
See id. at 520. 
121 S id ee . 
122 S id ee . 
123 S id ee . 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss1/5
2000] RIGHT TO COUNSEL 21 
Quinn with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
124 
At 
Quinn's firearms possession trial, Santonio Lamond Walker 
testified that he, not Quinn, drove the car during the 
pursuit.
125 
After Quinn was convicted, Quinn volunteered in-
formation to his cellmate that he, rather than Walker, drove 
the car.
126 
The prosecutors subsequently charged Quinn with 
suborning Walker to commit perjury.127 The Fifth Circuit found 
no Sixth Amendment violation because the suborning charge 
was not inextricably intertwined with the firearm charge. 128 
The court reasoned that even though the same evidence was 
admitted for the prosecution of both charges against Quinn, 
the offenses were not inextricably intertwined because they 
involved two distinct types of conduct. 129 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Dohertl30 




See Walker, 148 F.3d at 520. 
125 See id 
126 
See id. at 521. Suspecting that Quinn had suborned Walker'8 perjury in the fire-
arms possession trials, Police Officer Hall asked Quinn's cellmate, Rodney Seaton, to 
be attuned to anything Quinn might say about his recent trial, but not to initiate any 
conversation with Quinn. See id. Quinn volunteered to Seaton that he should not be in 
jail because his "home boy" had "stood up in court and took the rap for him being in 
the car." See id. 
127 
See Walker, 148 F.3d at 520. Quinn was indicted for suborning Walker via 18 
U.S.C § 1622 and Walker was indicted for knowingly making false material declara-
tions while under oath via 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). See id. Walker sought to suppress his 
statements made to his cellmate. See id. 
128 
See id. at 529-530. The court maintained that the United States Supreme Court 
in Moulton, 474 U.S. at 179-180, identified the correct standard as whether the con-
duct leading to each offense is the same. See id. at 529. The court relied on Kuhlmann 
I). Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 ·(1986), which held that no Sixth Amendment violation occurs 
where the defendant's statement to the informant were volunteered and the volun-
teering of the information was precipitated by events beyond the informant's control, 
in finding that no Sixth violation occurred when Quinn had volunteered incriminating 
statements to the informant. See Walker, 148 F.3d at 528-529. 
129 See id. at 529-530. The court further stated that the distinctly separate offense 
of firearms possession and subornation of perjury did not occur within a close temporal 
proximity. See id. at 529. 
130 • 
See 126 F.3d 769 (6th Clr. 1997). 
131 See id. at 776. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the question of how inextri-
cably intertwined two offenses must be so that the right to counsel attaches simulta-
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a Native American Tribal Court convicted Ross Allen Doherty 
of sexually abusing two children. 132 Subsequently, the FBI 
agents questioned Doherty regarding federal charges of 
knowingly engaging in a sexual act with a child.133 Doherty 
confessed to committing the sexual offenses.134 Because the 
same underlying conduct formed the basis for both offenses, 
the Sixth Circuit held that the right to counsel would have at-
tached to both charges.135 However, the tribal arraignment did 
not invoke the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the 
right to counsel is created by the United States Constitution 
which does not apply to American Indian tribal criminal pro-
ceedings.136 Thus, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the inextri-
cably intertwined exception but rejected its application because 
the first legal proceeding was an Indian tribal proceeding. 137 
b. Same Evidence Test 
Other courts have applied the inextricably intertwined ex-
ception when two offenses involved the same evidence. 138 For 
example, in United States v. Mitcheltree/39 the Tenth Circuit 
applied the "same evidence" test to determine if the charged 
neously with respect to both offenses is open to some doubt and left. the consideration 
of that question for another day. See id. 
132 
See id. at 772. The Hannaville Indian Community Tribal Court charged Doherty 
with statutory rape. See id. The molested children were Doherty's two stepdaughters. 
See Doherty, 126 F.3d at 772. 
133 . 
See ,d at 772-773. 
134 
See id. Doherty was convicted of knowingly engaging in a sexual act with a child 
via 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (1994), applicable to Native American reservations through 18 
U.S.C § 1153(a). See id. 
135 
See id. at 776. 
136 
See Doherty, 126 F.3d at 777. The Sixth Circuit relied on Talton v. Mayes, 163 
U.S. 376, 383-384 (1896) in holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does 
not apply to Indian tribes. See id. The court reasoned that, since the Indian tribes are 
distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original rights, the Sixth 
Amendment right did not apply to Indian tribes. See id. 
137 
See id. 
138 See generally United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir. 1991); 
Whittlesey v. Maryland, 665 A.2d 223, 235-236 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Rain-
water, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1223-1224 n.5 (Mass. 1997). 
139 See United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1991). 
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MDMA counts and the uncharged witness tampering count 
were inextricably intertwined.140 Rizzo, a friend of Mitcheltree, 
cooperated with the police by secretly taping her conversation 
with Mitcheltree.141 During the conversation, Rizzo encouraged 
Mitcheltree to talk about the pending MDMA offense as well 
as the witness tampering offense.142 Mitcheltree made incrimi-
nating statements concerning both offenses.143 The Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the police obtained incriminating statements 
relating directly to both the MDMA and witness tampering 
offenses, because both offenses involved the same evidence. 144 
Therefore, because the two crimes involved the same evidence 
in regards to proof of both the MDMA counts and witness tam-
pering, the Tenth Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel attached to both offenses.145 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Whittlesey v. 
Maryland 146 applied the "same evidence" test to determine if 
the two offenses are inextricably intertwined. 147 In Whittlesey, 
Mike Whittlesey asked David Strathy, Whittlesey's friend, to 
meet him at Gunpowder Falls State Park and help him dig up 
140 See id. at 1344-1345. Mitcheltree was charged with the distribution of the drug 
methylendioxymethamphetamine or MDMA. See id. at 1332. MDMA is a designer 
drug sometimes known as ecstasy, which did not become subject to federal controlled 
substance penalties until October 27, 1986. See id. at 1335. She was later convicted for 
introducing a misbranded drug into interstate commerce with the intent to mislead or 
defraud, 21 U.S.C §§ 331(a) & 333(a)(2); conspiracy to commit this offense, 18 U.S.C § 
37; and witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(bX3). See id. 
141 See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1340. According to Rizzo her purpose was to see if 
the defendant was going to try to change her testimony. See id. 
142 See id. at 1337-1338. 
143 See id. The transcript of the conversation contains many personal details about 
Mitcheltree that one might reveal to a close friend. Rizzo sought Mitcheltree's advice 
as to what she should say and do in connection with the investigation. See id. 
144 fli . I d h . See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1344-1345. MDMA 0 ense mvo ve t e same eVI-
dence for the witness tampering evidence, therefore, the two offenses are closely re-
lated in time and subject matter. See id. 
145 S id ee . 
146 
See 665 A.2d 223 (Md. 1995). 
147 See id. at 235-236. 
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some gold and silver. 148 Once Strathy arrived at the park, Stra-
thy learned that Whittlesey really wanted to bury a dead 
body. 149 Strathy immediately left the scene and made an 
anonymous report to the police.160 Separate from the anony-
mous report, the police visited Strathy and Strathy reported 
incident involving the body in the woods. 161 The police enlisted 
Strathy to arrange meetings with Whittlesey to try to elicit 
information about Griffin's disappearance.162 Strathy cooper-
ated with the police and recorded a conversation between him-
self and Whittlesey through a body wire. 163 The body wire en-
abled the police to record several conversations in which Whit-
tlesey made numerous incriminating statements.164 The police 
used this evidence to support charges against Whittlesey for 
allegedly making false statements to the police.166 Later, Whit-
tlesey was convicted for murdering Griffin. 166 The court deter-
mined that the false statements charge could have been sup-
ported by evidence that Whittlesey told the police inconsistent 
stories in his two meetings with the police, without regard to 
which story was true.167 Furthermore, the State could have 
disproved many of Whittlesey's statements to the police, such 
as his claim to have gone to Washington with Griffin, without 
having to show that Whittlesey had killed Griffin.168 In addi-
tion, the court reasoned that committing murder is separate 
from an attempt to avoid responsibility for it. 169 Consequently, 
148 See id. at 228. 
149 S id ee . 
160 See id. at 228-229. 
161 
See Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 228-229. 
162 See id. at 229. 
163 S 'd ee, . 
164 . 
See id. at 229. The Strathy conversations included a detailed description of how 
Whittlesey buried Griffin's body. See id. 
166 
See Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 232. 
156 See id. at 229. 
157 See id. at 236. 
158 S 'd ee, . 
159 S 'd ee, . 
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the Whittlesey court found that the two charges were not inex-
tricably intertwined under the "same evidence" test because 
the proof elements for the two charges did not necessarily re-
quire identical evidence. 160 
In addition, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Whittlesey 
v. Maryland 161 observed that some courts require that time, 
place and persons be the same to determine whether the facts 
underlying the charge and uncharged offenses are inextricably 
intertwined.162 In Whittlesey, the court concluded that the false 
statements charge and the murder charge were not inextrica-
bly intertwined under the "time, place and persons" test, be-
cause the false statements occurred days after the murder in 
another location. l63 Therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel did not cover both the false statement and murder of-
fenses. l64 
c. Time, Place, and Persons Test 
The Ninth Circuit suggested that the inextricably inter-
twined exception applies if the charged and the uncharged of-
fenses involve the same time, place, and persons.165 In United 
States v. Hines,166 the Ninth Circuit declined to apply the inex-
160 . 
See Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 236. The court relied on United States v. Williams, 
993 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1993) and Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104-1105 (9th 
Cir. 1992) where the Fifth and Ninth Circuit courts respectively held that the inextri-
cably intertwined exception did not apply because the two offenses had totally inde-
pendent elements, and the two crimes occurred at a different time and location. See id. 
at 235-236. 
161 
See Whittlesey v. Maryland, 665 A.2d 223 (1995). 
162 
See id. 234-236. The court reviewed many prior cases which have attempted to 
define what is required to fall under the inextricably intertwined exception. See id. For 
example, the court observed that the Ninth Circuit in Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258, and 
Hendricks, 974 F.2d at 1104-1105 have looked for identity of time, place, and conduct 
to determine whether the same acts underlie both charges. See id. at 235-236. 
163 
See Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 236. 
164 
See id. 
165 See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104-1105 (9th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-258 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Martinez, 972 
F.2d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 1992). 
166 
See 963 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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tricably intertwined exception because the defendant's firearm 
crimes occurred in two separate months. 167 Although the for-
mal and subsequent charges involved the identical firearm of-
fense, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the time, place, and 
persons differed. 168 
In United States v. Martinez,169 the Ninth Circuit again refused 
to apply the inextricably intertwined exception for similar 
firearm offenses.17o Martinez was arrested and charged with 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, theft of a firearm, 
and possession of a controlled substance. 171 However, the state 
charges were dismissed.172 Federal agents then questioned 
Martinez regarding the federal offense of possession of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon. 173 During the interrogation, Martinez 
admitted that he had knowingly purchased the handgun.174 On 
the same day, Martinez made his first appearance in federal 
court and counsel was appointed.175 The Ninth Circuit stated 
that it would not extend the inextricably intertwined exception 
after dismissal of the initial charge,176 reasoning that such a 
"broad prophylactic rule" ran counter to the established Sixth 
167 See id. at 257-258. At the time where agent questioned Hines about January 
1989 activities, Hines had been provided counl!el for state prosecution activities in 
December 1988. See id. 
168 S 'd ee, . 
169 See 972 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1992). 
170 . 
See generally ,d. at 1103-1105. 
171 See id. 1101. 
172 See id. at 1102. 
173 See id. The federal agents advised Martinez of his Miranda rights, which he 
waived. See Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1102. 
174 See id. Martinez executed an affidavit admitting that he had knowingly pur-
chased the handgun. See id. 
175 S 'd ee, . 
176 See id. at 1104. First, the Ninth Circuit observed that the two firearm offenses 
arose from the same conduct. See Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1104. Second, the Ninth Cir-
cuit declined to extend the inextricably intertwined indefinitely for it would improp-
erly require suppression of a statement given to federal authorities regarding a federal 
crime, if unbeknown to the federal agents, the suspect had been charged for the same 
substantive act at some earlier time. See id. at 1104-1105. 
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Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence.177 Therefore, in 
order satisfy the "time, place and persons test," the defendant 
must not only show that the time, place, and persons were 
identical in both offenses, the defendant must also have a 
charge pending to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches before the court will extend that protection to a sub-
fli 178 sequent 0 ense .. 
d. Factual Predicate Test 
The Third and Fourth Circuits provide that the inextricably 
intertwined exception applies when the factual predicate of 
each offense are identical.179 In United States v. Arnold,180 the 
Third Circuit held that the right to counsel may carry over 
from the pending charge to a new charge if the new charge 
arose from the same acts and factual predicate on which the 
pending charges were based.181 In Arnold, Dean Arnold stole 
money and told his then fiancee, Jennifer Kloss, about the 
theft. 182 Fearing that Kloss would tell the FBI about his 
crimes, Arnold told several people including Alex Introcaso, a 
private investigator, that he would pay $20,000.00 to kill 
Kloss.183 Introcaso contacted the FBI and reported Arnold's of-
177 See id. at 1104-1105. The Ninth Circuit observed that the United States Su-
preme Court in Maine v. Moulton and McNeil v. Wisconsin stressed the narrow appli-
cation of the Sixth Amendment and also recognized the importance of alloWing the 
police to initiate and pursue investigations of new or additional crimes. See Martinez, 
972 F.2d at 1104-1105. See also Hendricks, 974 F.2d at 1104, where the Ninth Circuit 
again rejected the application of the inextricably intertwined exception. See id. at 
1104-1105. The court noted that this exception is a "limited exception." See id. 
178 See Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258; Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1104-1105. 
179 See United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1997). 
180 See 106 F.3d 37 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
181 See id. at 41-42. "We adopt the 'closely related' exception and hold that it ap-
plies here." See id. at 42. The Third Circuit relied on Whittlesey v. Maryland, 665 A2d 
223 (Md. 1995) in determining whether the same acts and factual predicates underlie 
both charges. See id. at 41. The Third Circuit observed that courts have looked for 
similarities of time, place, person and conduct. See id. 
182 
See Arnold, 106 F.3d at 38. 
183 See id. at 39. Introcaso suspected that Arnold had committed the federal Ar-
mored Express thefts and contacted the police to obtain a reward. See id. 
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fer to have Kloss killed. l84 The prosecutor obtained a sealed 
indictment against Arnold charging him with bank theft, 
money laundering and witness intimidation.185 That afternoon, 
Arnold stated his threat to kill Kloss to an undercover officer 
posing as a professional hit man.18s Subsequently, the govern-
ment indicted Arnold with attempted murder of a witness.187 
Arnold sought to suppress his conversation with the under-
cover officer. 188 The court agreed and adopted the "factual 
predicate" test, finding that the central purpose and the in-
tended results of both offenses were the same.189 Therefore, the 
Third Circuit held that both offenses arose from the same 
predicate facts, conduct, intent and circumstances, and conse-
quently, concluded that the inextricably intertwined exception 
1· d 190 app Ie . 
Similarly, in United States v. Kidd/91 the Fourth Circuit 
held that the uncharged offense must derive from the same 
factual predicate as the charged offense in order to fall within 
the closely related exception.192 In Kidd, the government in-
184 See id. The FBI recorded a meeting between Introcaso and Arnold where Intro-
caso told Arnold that he had located a hit man willing to kill Kloss for $20,000.00. See 
id. 
185 .• 
See Arnold, 106 F.3d at 39. The Witness charge specifically alleged that Arnold 
had threatened to kill Kloss if she provided information to law enforcement officers 




See id. The tape recording Arnold's interest in killing Kloss was the only evi-
dence the government submitted with respect to the attempted murder charge. See id. 
188 
See Arnold, 106 F.3d at 39. 
189 See id. at 41-42. 
190 See id. The Third Circuit observed that both offenses involved the same witness, 
were related in time, and had the same motive. See id. 
191 See 12F.3d 30 (4th Cir. 1993). 
192 See id. at 33. This court held that although the uncharged crime involved the 
same type of crime as the charged offense, it involved a different purchaser-informant, 
occurred at a different time, and took place in a different location. See id. The Fourth 
Circuit further asserted that the Sixth Amendment does not create a sanctuary for the 
commission of additional crimes during the pendency of an indictment. See id. Fur-
thermore, the Fourth Circuit held that even if time, place, persons all are the same as 
to both offenses, a defendant must also demonstrate that the interrogation on the new 
offenses produced incriminating evidence as to the previously charged offense. See 
28
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dicted Norman Kidd on six drug charges after government in-
formants tape-recorded approximately seven of Kidd's sales of 
cocaine base, also known as crack.193 On July 3, 1992, govern-
ment officials arrested Kidd and appointed counsel for him. 194 
On August 26, an undercover informant who had no prior con-
tact with Kidd made a tape-recorded crack purchase from 
Kidd.195 The court concluded that the August 26 sale was fac-
tually distinct from and independent of the prior offenses for 
which the Sixth Amendment right had been invoked.196 There-
fore, the charge of selling cocaine did not relate to the earlier 
charges for which Kidd had been indicted.197 The court stated 
that even if the court applied the "same course of conduct" test, 
Kidd would still be convicted of a superseding charge of con-
spiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and co-
caine possession and distribution. 198 Thus, the court focused on 
the factual predicate of the underlying offenses rather than 
evaluating whether the two offenses involved the same course 
of conduct. 199 As a result, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the 
United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1014-1015 (4th Cir. 1998). The Fourth Circuit 
reasoned that the inextricably intertwined exception must be crafted to avoid ham-
pering legitimate, necessary law enforcement investigations. See id. 
193 See Kidd, 12 F.3d at 31. Kidd was charged with five counts of cocaine possession 
and distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and one count of conspiracy to possess with 
intent to distribute cocaine base per 21 U.S.C. § 846. See id. 
194 See id. Counsel was appointed three days after Kidd's arrest. See id. 
195 
See id. at 31-32. 
196 
See Kidd, 12 F.3d at 33-34. 
197 See id. The later drug investigation concerned only new criminal activity. See id. 
The court suggested that a Sixth Amendment violation would have resulted if the sale 
had involved the same time, place, and persons. See id. 
198 See id. at 34. The defendant argued that both drug transactions were identical, 
and therefore, arose from the same course of conduct. See Kidd, 12 F.3d at 34. The 
court disagreed, stating that even if the court applied the same course of conduct, the 
facts underlying the offenses is still controlling. See id. 
199 See id. at 34. This court held that the same course of conduct is more semantic 
than real and is controlled by factual and temporal relationships among the offenses. 
See id. The court explained that the mere fact that both the pending offense and new 
offense involved drug distribution does not mean the right to counsel attached to both. 
See id. To hold otherwise would essentially permit charged suspects to commit similar 
crimes with impunity. See Kidd, 12 F.3d at 33. 
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inextricably intertwined exception, yet rejected its 
1· t' 200 app lca Ion. 
e. Nucleii of Operative Fact Test 
The First Circuit, in United States v. Nocella,201 suggested 
that the inextricably intertwined exception applied when the 
charged offense and the subsequent offense arose out a com-
mon nucleii of operative fact. 202 In Nocella, after the state 
charged Robert Nocella with possession of marijuana, an in-
formant recorded an order of cocaine from Nocella.203 Nocella 
alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached to 
the subsequent cocaine charges, and therefore, should be sup-
pressed.204 The First Circuit disagreed, stating that the pur-
pose of the continuing investigation against Nocella was not to 
be used to unearth incriminating evidence for the marijuana 
charge, but for the new drug offense.205 Thus, the government 
acted in an investigatory, not accusatory, manner with regard 
to the cocaine offense.206 The First Circuit concluded that the 
marijuana and cocaine charges arose out of a different nucleii 
of operative fact, because the possession of marijuana and co-
caine offenses necessitated proof of disparate elements and 
200 
See id. at 34. In rejecting Kidd's right to counsel claim, the Fourth Circuit rea-
soned that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not create a sanctuary for the commission of 
additional crimes during the pendency of an indictment and to exclude such evidence 
would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the investigation of criminal 
activities." See id. at 33 (citing Maine u. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985). 
201 See 849 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1988). 
202 
See id. at 38. 
203 
See id. at 34-35. 
204 
See id. at 35. 
205 
See id. at 37-38. 
206 See Nocella, 849 F.2d at 38. The First Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment 
right had not attached to the cocaine offense. See id. Therefore, when the government 
had investigated charges to the new offense, it was investigatory not accusatory. See 
id. 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss1/5
2000] RIGHT TO COUNSEL 31 
occurred at different times.207 Thus, the First Circuit rejected 
the application of the inextricably intertwined exception.20s 
In Taylor v. Florida,209 the court again focused on the un-
derlying facts of both offenses in order to determine whether 
the inextricably intertwined exception applied.210 In Taylor, 
Dennis J. Taylor had been arrested and charged with dealing 
in stolen property.211 Later, Detective Graham interrogated 
Taylor, regarding a burglary offense.212 The court suppressed 
Taylor's incriminating statements regarding the burglary of-
fense based on the inextricably intertwined exception.213 The 
court observed that the two offenses involved the same physi-
cal evidence, acts and factual predicates.214 Moreover, Taylor's 
.knowledge that the jewelry had been stolen was a crucial ele-
ment of the dealing in dealing in stolen property offense.216 
Therefore, the court found that both offenses arose from the 
same facts and circumstances because the offense of dealing in 
207 See ill. at 38. The First Circuit explained the state and federal offenses were 
"scissile'" rather than inextricably intertwined. See ill. To ignore the separateness 
-would "needlessly frustrate the public's interest in investigation of criminal activities." 
See Nocella, 849 F.2d at 38. The court asserted that the Sixth Amendment's intended 
·function is not to wrap a protective cloak around the defendant. See ill. at 38. 
20S S ' ill ee . 
209 
726 So. 2d 841(1st Cir. 1999). 
210 
See ill. at 845. 
211 See ill. at 842. A burglary investigation by Detective Graham revealed that four 
pieces of jewelry belonging to Curry were pawned in the name of Taylor and thumb-
print were found on the pawn ticket for these items. See id. 
212 See ill. at 842-843. Detective Graham asked Taylor if he had anything to do with 
the burglary of the Curry residence, because Detective Graham was interested in 
where the stolen property initially came from. See Taylor, 726 So. at 843. The State 
did not prosecute the burglary charge. See id. 
213 
See id. at 846. 
214 
See ill. Furthermore, the First Circuit stated that the similarities of time, place, 
person and conduct of both offense were striking. See ill. 
216 See Taylor, 726 So. at 846. "Here, the inquiry concerning the burglary sought in-
formation from Taylor concerning the loss of the very same jewelry that formed the 
basis of the offense for which had been charged." [d. 
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stolen property involved the act of obtaining and using prop-
erty belonging to the burglary victim.216 
2. Circumvention of the Sixth Amendment Right Exception 
Although the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Covarrubias 
only addressed the inextricably intertwined exception, this 
Note briefly discusses the circumvention of right exception.217 
As previously mentioned, the United States Supreme Court in 
Maine v. Moulton ruled that law enforcement has an affirma-
tive obligation to act in a manner that does not circumvent, 
and thereby, dilute the protection afforded by the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.218 Accordingly, several courts 
have construed the circumvention of right exception more 
broadly than the inextricably intertwined exception where evi-
dence indicates that the police deliberately circumvented the 
prohibition of questioning in respect to the charged offense.219 
In United States v. Martinez,22o the Ninth Circuit offered 
several factors for determining whether the circumvention of 
right exception applies.221 For example, the Ninth Circuit will 
consider: first, the degree of federal participation in the state's 
decision to dismiss state charges; second, the degree of state 
participation in its decision to interrogate and charge the de-
216 
See id. 
217. • . 
See Umted States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Clr. 1999). "Because 
our holding that the offenses were 'inextricably intertwined' or 'closely related' pro-
vides a sufficient basis to affirm the district court's suppression order, we do not con-
sider whether the district judge was also correct in holding the 'circumvention of Sixth 
Amendment right' exception applicable as well." [d. 
218 
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (985). 
219 
See Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1223-1224 n.5 (Mass. 1997); 
Whittlesey v. Maryland, 665 A.2d 223, 235 (Md. 1995). See also generally United 
States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 OOth Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1104-1105 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rodriguez, 931 F. 
Supp. 907, 926-927 (D. Mass. 1996); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1013-
1015 (4th Cir. 1998). 
220 
See, 972 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1992). 
221 . 
See id. at 1106. 
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fendant; three, the degree of joint decision-making over the 
forum in which the defendant should be prosecuted.222 
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Ter-
zado-Madruga223 held that the government violates the Sixth 
Amendment whenever a government informant actively en-
gages a defendant in a conversation that is likely to elicit in-
criminating statements about the defendant's upcoming 
tria1.224 By obtaining information through an undercover in-
formant, the police deny the defendant the right to rely on 
counsel as the medium between the accused and the govern-
ment.225 Therefore, when the government uses an -agent such 
as an informant to actively initiate a conversation that is likely 
to elicit incriminating evidence to which the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel has attached, the government has circum-
vented the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 226 
Likewise, in United States v. Mitcheltree,227 discussed infra, 
the court suppressed a taped conversation based on the cir-
cumvention of right exception.228 When there is a deliberate 
Sixth Amendment violation, the government may not use the 
defendant's uncounseled incriminating statements of those or 
very closely related subsequent charges at tria1.229 Mitchel-
tree's hairdresser, Rizzo, cooperated with the police by agree-
ing to ask broad questions to Mitcheltree about the subject 
matter of the charged offense.230 These open-ended questions 
made it virtually certain that the defendant would discuss the 
222 . 
See id. The Ninth Circuit stated that the key factor is the extent of coordination 
between state and federal authorities. See id. 
223 See United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099 (11th Cir. 1990). 
224 
See id. at 1110. 
225 
See id. at 1109-1110. 
226 
See id . 
. 227 
See 940 F.2d 1329 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
228 
See id. at 1341. 
229 
See id. at 1341-1342. 
230 See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1337-1338. The defendant's attorney specifically ad-
vised her not to talk to anybody that might be a potential witness. See id. at 1336. 
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details of the pending MDMA counts.231 The Tenth Circuit 
characterized the behavior by the police as circumventing 
Mitcheltree's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.232 Hence, the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel covered both the charged 
and uncharged offenses. 233 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUITS ANALYSIS 
In United States v. Covarrubias,234 the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered whether questioning of Covarrubias and Ochoa by I.N.S. 
Agent Gonzalez violated their Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel. 235 The Ninth Circuit evaluated the government's appeal in 
light of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and decided that the 
government had violated the defendant s' Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. 236 
A. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ATTACHED TO THE STATE 
KIDNAPPING CHARGE 
In determining whether or not the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel attached to the defendants' state kidnapping 
231 
See id. at 1340. Because the informant asked such broad questions to cover the 
pending charge although aimed at another uncharged offense, it was a knowing cir-
cumvention of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. at 1340-1341. At least 
seven times, Rizzo sought the defendant's advice as to what she should say and do in 
connection with the investigation. See id. at 1340. Rizzo also asked about defendant's 
testimony and her knowledge of the conspiracy. See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1340. 
232 See id. The Tenth Circuit found that Rizzo was more than a passive listener; she 
exercised skill at leading the conversation into particular topics and prompting par-
ticular replies. See id. The Tenth Circuit stated, "[I]n an effort to lead the defendant 
into witness tampering, Rizzo inquired into the pending charges in more than a tan-
gential way, and violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights on the pending 
MDMA charges." See id. Furthermore, the court found that the prosecutor took no 
steps to insure that the informant did not communicate with the defendant about the 
pending charges and consequently the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
was compromised. See id. n.13. 
233 See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1344-1345. 
234 
See 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999). 
235 
See generally id. 
236 S 'd ee I • 
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charge,237 the Ninth Circuit stated that the right to counsel 
attaches once the prosecution has initiated adversary judicial 
proceedings against the defendant(s).238 Therefore, the right to 
counsel had attached to the state crime of kidnapping when 
the defendants were arraigned and appointed counsel.239 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel is offense specific,240 which prohibits govern-
ment initiated interrogation regarding only the offense to 
which the right to counsel has attached.241 Thus, the Sixth 
Amendment prohibited government initiated interrogation 
only concerning the state kidnapping charge.242 Neverthele,ss, 
the Ninth Circuit explained that appellate courts, in applying 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, have recognized two 
clear exceptions to this offense specific requirement: the inex-
tricably intertwined and the circumvention of the Sixth 
Amendment right exception.243 Since the court held that the 
right to counsel attached to the state kidnapping charge, the 
court went on to discuss whether the right to counsel also at-
tached to the subsequent charge of transporting illegal 
aliens.244 
237 
See id at 1223. 
238 See id. The United States Supreme Court stated that adversarial judicial pro-
ceedings are initiated only when the government has committed itself to prosecute. 
See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-188 (1984). 
239. . . 
See Covarrublas, 179 F.3d at 1223. Arraignment and appomtment of counsel at 
the preliminary hearing are adversarial judicial proceeding. See also Kirby v. Dlinois, 
406 U.S. 682,687-688 (1972) (the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at 
or immediately after the initiation of an adversarial judicial proceeding whether by 
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment). 
240 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223. See also supra note 2 and accompanying , 
text (discussing the offense specific requirement). 
241 
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
242 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223. 
243 S id ee . 
244 S id ee . 
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B. APPLICATION OF THE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED 
EXCEPTION 
The inextricably intertwined exception provides that when 
the pending charge is so closely related with the charge under 
investigation, the right to counsel attaches to both charges, 
even if the government has not formally initiated an adver-
sarial judicial proceeding on the pending charge.245 In its dis-
cussion of the inextricably intertwined exception, the Ninth 
Circuit relied on decisions from both the United States Su-
preme Court and other Circuits.246 
The Ninth Circuit conceded that the United States Supreme 
Court had not expressly adopted the inextricably intertwined 
exception.247 However, the court stressed that the United 
States Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the inextricably in-
tertwined exception in Brewer v. Williams248 and Maine v. 
111 1 249 lV.l.ou ton. 
In Brewer, the United States Supreme Court suppressed 
statements made by the defendant regarding the murder 
charge even though the right to counsel attached only for the 
abduction charge.25o Based on Brewer, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that the United States Supreme Court "treated the right 
as if it also applied to the murder charges involving the same 
. 'd t d' t' ,,251 InCl en an VIC 1m. 
In Moulton, the United States Supreme Court expressed 
the same principle.252 In Moulton, although the right to counsel 
245 S id ee . 
246 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1224. 
247 
See id. at 1224. 
248 
See generally 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (suppressing incriminating statements for de-
fendant's murder trial although formally charged with abduction). 
249 
See generally 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (suppressing incriminating statements for 
burglary although formally charged with theft). 
250 
See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404-406. 
251 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d. at 1224. 
252 
See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180. 
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attached to only a theft charge, the United States Supreme 
Court suppressed statements regarding a subsequent burglary 
charge because the police breached their affirmative obligation 
to honor the Sixth Amendment right to counse1.253 
Analyzing the two United States Supreme Court decisions 
in Brewer and Moulton, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
right to counsel may attach to separate offenses as long as the 
court finds a close factual relationship between them.254 Thus, 
the Ninth Circuit in Covarrubias court recognized the inextri-
cably intertwined exception to the offense specific 
. t 255 . reqwremen. 
As the United States Supreme Court has not delineated the 
parameters of the inextricably intertwined exception, the 
Ninth Circuit also relied on the decisions of other federal cir-
cuits, including its own, that have previously applied the inex-
tricably intertwined exception.256 The court began with the first 
case in which it acknowledged the inextricably intertwined 
t . 257 excep Ion. 
In United States v. Hines,258 the Ninth Circuit held that if 
time, place, and persons differed even for the same offense, the 
inextricably intertwined exception does not apply.259 Later, in 
253 
See id. The Court found that the state breached its affirmative obligation not to 
circumvent the right to assistance of counsel. See id. 
254 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1224. The Covarrubias court believed that every 
circuit court that has considered or adopted the inextricably intertwined exception has 
uniformly read Brewer v. Williams and Maine v. Moulton in the same manner. See id. 
at 1223. "On the basis of a uniform reading of the two United States Supreme Court 
cases, every circuit to consider the question, including our own, has recognized an 
exception to the offense-specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment. " [d. 
255 
See id. at 1224. 
256 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1224-1225. 
257 S id ee . 
258 
See 963 F.2d at 255. 
259 
See id. The Ninth Circuit decided that the inextricably intertwined exception did 
not apply because the place, time, and persons involved were all different. See id. 
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United States v. Martinez, the Ninth Circuit declined to apply 
the exception when the state charge had been dismissed.260 
Aware that no single test determines when the inextricably 
intertwined exception applies, the Ninth Circuit looked to the 
other circuits for guidance.261 For example, the court discussed 
United States v. Arnold,262 in which the Third Circuit utilized 
the "factual predicate" test.263 In Arnold, the Third Circuit 
held that the inextricably intertwined exception will apply if 
the two offenses arose from the same predicate facts, intent, 
circumstances and conduct.264 Conversely, if the factual predi-
cate differed, then the inextricably intertwined exception 
would not apply.266 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's rea-
sons for applying the inextricably intertwined exception.266 The 
district court held that the state kidnapping charges and fed-
eral charges for transportation of an illegal alien were inextri-
260 
See United States v. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth 
Circuit denied the application of the inextricably intertwined exception due to their 
reluctance to extend the doctrine indefinitely into the future after the initial charge 
was dismissed. See id. The Ninth Circuit held that the reasoning of Maine and Moul-
ton, which stressed both the narrow application of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel and the importance of allowing police to initiate and pursue investigations. 
See id. at 1104-1105. 
261 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226. The Ninth Circuit stated that the 
Ninth Circuit in Hines failed to identify the specific factors for when the inextricably 
intertwined exception applies. See id. at 1224 (citing Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258). 
262 . 
See Uruted States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
263 See id. at 42. 
264 
See id. at 41-42. The Third Circuit found that the inextricably intertwined ex-
ception applied for witness intimidation and attempted murder because the intended 
victim of both crimes was the same, the offenses arose from the same facts and cir-
cumstances, the conduct was closely related in time, and the two acts were in further-
ance of the same purpose. See id. 
266 See United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1993). The Fourth Circuit 
held that the cocaine distribution conspiracy, which ended in May 1992, was not inex-
tricably intertwined with a subsequent sale in August of 1992. See id. The Fourth 
Circuit came to this conclusion because the individuals involved, the time, and loca-
tion of the offenses were all different. See id. 
266 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225 n.7. 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss1/5
2000] RIGHT TO COUNSEL 39 
cably intertwined based on the "same course of conduct" test.267 
The district court stated that the inextricably intertwined ex-
ception applied because it would have been difficult to confine 
one's questioning to the facts and circumstances of one offense 
without straying into a discussion of the other.268 
The Ninth Circuit created a new "continuous course of con-
duct" test.269 Thus, to decide whether the inextricably inter-
twined exception applies, a court should examine and compare 
all of the facts and circumstances relating to the conduct in-
volved, including the identity of the persons involved, and the 
timing, motive, and location of the crimes.270 In addition, no 
single factor is dispositive.271 The court stated that the greater 
the commonality of the factors and the more the conduct is di-
rectly involved between the formal and subsequent offenses, 
the two offenses will likely fall under the inextricably inter-
twined exception.272 Applying the "continuous course of con-
duct" test, the Ninth Circuit held that the kidnapping and 
transportation of an illegal alien offenses were inextricably 
. tert' d 273 10 WIne. 
267 See id. The government's evidence alleges that the defendants unlawfully trans-
ported Hernandez, in re~kless disregard for his alien status and then unlawfully de-
tained Hernandez against his will when he did not have sufficient funds to pay for his 
transfer. See id. Because of the relatedness of the kidnapping and unlawful transport 
charges, the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel became effective as to both 
offenses once defendants were assigned counsel during their state. court proceedings. 
See id. 
268 
See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Sup-
press at 9-10, United States v. Covarrubias (No. CR-98-2030-RHW, No. CR-98-2031-
RHW). The district court also held that even if the two offenses were not inextricably 
intertwined, the Sixth Amendment attached for both offenses at the time of the state 
court preliminary hearing because the two investigations and prosecutions were the 
result of a joint effort between state and federal authorities. See id. at 9. 
269 S id ee . 
270 S id ee . at 1225 n.6. 
271 
See id. (relying on the Third Circuit in Arnold, 106 F.3d at 41-42). 
272 See id. (quoting Arnold, 106 F.3d at 41-42). 
273 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226. The Ninth Circuit held that the inextricably 
intertwined exception applied for Seven reasons. See id. First, the timing of the federal 
and state crimes overlapped in part in Sunnyside Washington while the defendants 
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's contention that 
the two offenses involved different time, place and persons.274 
Further, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government's argument 
that the federal crime of transporting of an illegal alien was a 
completed offense, but rather concluded that it was a continu-
ing offense.275 Consequently, the timing of the federal and 
state crimes did overlap.276 Moreover, the defendants perpe-
trated both offenses: holding Hernandez for ransom and trans-
porting Hernandez who was an illegal alien.277 This overlap 
persuaded the court that the two offenses involved a continu-
ous course of conduct, not a separate and distinct course of 
conduct.278 Hernandez' role in both crimes supported this con-
clusion.279 The court added that, even if the defendants com-
mitted the federal crime in multiple locations, both crimes took 
restrained Hernandez, an illegal alien, against his will in the Covarrubias' van .. See id. 
at 1226. Second, the two offenses involved a continuous course of conduct because the 
federal crime of transportation of an illegal alien continued by the time the defendants 
detained Hernandez against his will. See id. Third, the defendants Covarrubias and 
Ochoa were the perpetrators of both offenses. See id. Fourth, Hernandez was the vic-
tim in the kidnapping charge and one of the persons illegally transported in the other 
crime. See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226. Fifth, both crimes took place, at least in 
part, in Sunnyside, Washington. See id. Sixth, the defendants had an identical mo-
tive, obtaining remuneration, in committing both crimes. See id. Seventh, both 
crimes arose from the same set of facts, the transportation of Hernandez. See id. 
274 . 
See Id. at 1225-1226. The government claimed that the defendants completed 
the federal offense when the defendants left Los Angeles with the intention of trans-
porting illegal aliens, whereas the kidnapping offense did not begin until they held 
Hernandez for ransom in Washington. See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225 n.7. Thus, 
the government argued that the state and federal offenses differed in the dates, times, 
and locations, because the defendants completed the federal crime of transportation of 
an illegal alien before the state kidnapping crime began. See id. The government also 
contended that the victims of both crimes differed: Hernandez as the victim of kidnap-
ping and the United States as the victim of the federal crime of transportation of an 
illegal alien. See id. 
275 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226. 
276 S id ee . 
277 . 
See Id. 
278 See id. The court stated that the transportation of illegal aliens continued for as 
long as the defendants transported Hernandez. See id. at 1225-1226. 
279 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226. Hernandez was the victim of the kidnapping 
offense and was one of the aliens of the transportation of illegal aliens, rather than 
focusing on the issue who was the victim. See id. 
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place at least in part in Washington, so the "continuous course 
of conduct" test controlled.2so 
For the aforementioned reasons, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the right to counsel, which had attached to the crime of kid-
napping, extended to the uncharged federal crime of illegal 
transportation of an illegal alien because both crimes were in-
extricably intertwined.2s1 As a result, the questioning of Covar-
rubias and Ochoa by I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez regarding the un-
charged offense of transportation of an illegal alien without the 
presence of counsel constituted a violation of their Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.2S2 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court's decision to suppress the incrimi-
nating statements made by Covarrubias and Ochoa.283 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion is based solely on the appli-
cability of the inextricably intertwined exception to the offense 
specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. 284 This note asserts that the Ninth Circuit's "continu-
ous course of conduct" test runs counter to existing precedent. 
In addition, the court should have applied the circumvention of 
right exception instead of the in~xtricably intertwined excep-
tion. 
The United States Supreme Court offers no guidelines for 
applying the inextricably intertwined exception and has not 
expressly adopted the inextricably intertwined exception.286 In 
fact, the United States Supreme Court stands for the principle 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense 
2S0 S id ee . 
2S1 • 
See Covarrubr.as, 179 F.3d at 1226. 
2S2 • 
See id at 1226. 
2S3 S id ee . 
284 See id. at 1223. 
286 See United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999). The 
United States Supreme Court has only implicitly endorsed this exception. See id. 
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specific.288 Consequently, the circuit courts that have adopted 
the inextricably intertwined exception have defined this excep-
tion narrowly and applied it sparingly.287 More specifically, the 
majority of the courts that have recognized the inextricably 
intertwined exception have rejected its application.288 By con-
trast, the Ninth Circuit broadly construed and applied the in-
extricably intertwined exception.289 Therefore, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's broad application in Unitea. States v. Covarrubias is un-
precedented and questionable. Instead, the Ninth Circuit could 
have suppressed the incriminating statements made by Covar-
rubias and Ochoa since I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez knowingly cir-
cumvented the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
A. THE APPLICATION OF THE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED 
EXCEPTION IN COVARRUBIAS IS TENUOUS 
1. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Follow Its Own Precedent 
Previous Ninth Circuit cases have defined the inextricably 
. t rt . d t' I 290 I U . d S R' 291 m e wme excep Ion narrow y. n mte tates v. mes, 
the Ninth Circuit determined that the inextricably intertwined 
exception did not apply for similar firearm offenses since time, 
place and persons differed.292 In Martinez, the Ninth Circuit 
declined to extend the inextricably intertwined exception in-
286 
See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
287 




See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226 (adopting the "continuous course of con-
duct" test). 
290 
See United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1992) (charged firearms 
possession was not inextricably intertwined to the uncharged firearms offense, since 
time, place, and per80ns differed); United States V. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1103-
1105 (9th Cir. 1992) (the inextricably intertwined exception did not apply for two 
similar firearms offenses, since the court was reluctant to extend the doctrine indefi-
nitely after the state charge was dismissed); Hendricks V. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 
1104-1105 (9th Cir. 1992) (the murder charge and interstate flight charge to avoid 
murder charges were not inextricably intertwined, because each crime had totally 
independent elements and did not arise from the same course of conduct). 
291 
See 963 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1992). 
292 
See Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258. 
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definitely to a subsequent firearm charge when the state dis-
missed the initial firearm offense.293 . 
Furthermore, in Hendricks v. Vasquez,294 the Ninth Circuit 
utilized both the "same course of conduct" and "time, place, 
and persons" tests to find that interstate flight to avoid prose-
cution of murder was not inextricably intertwined with the 
underlying murder charge under either test.295 The court con-
cluded that the exception did not apply because one offense 
predated the other and each offense had totally different proof 
elements.296 These cases clearly demonstrate that the Ninth 
circuit has previously defined the inextricably intertwined ex-
ception narrowly requiring identical time, place, and persons· 
or identical elements of proof.297 
In Covarrubias, the kidnapping and transportation of an 
illegal alien were not inextricably intertwined based on previ-
ous Ninth Circuit decisions because the time, place and per-
293 
See Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1104-05. The Ninth Circuit found against the applica-
tion of the inextricably intertwined exception, because a broad prophylactic application 
of the Sixth Amendment runs counter to the reasoning of Moulton and McNeil, which 
stressed both the narrow application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the 
importance of allowing police to initiate and pursue investigations. See id. Implemen-
tation of this rule would mean that a federal agent could not question a suspect with-
out first determining that that stat had not charged the suspect with a crime arising 
out of the same acts which would needlessly frustrates the public'S interest. See id. 
294 
See 974 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1992). 
295 
See id. at 1104-1105. 
296 
See id. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that interstate flight to avoid prosecu-
tion for murder and the murder offense in San Francisco were related. See id. How-
ever, the two offenses have totally independent elements and the two offenses did not 
arise from the same conduct. See id. Therefore; the court held that as uncharged and 
distinct "additional crimes," they were not subject to the sixth amendment right to 
counsel that attached when Hendricks was arraigned on his flight charge. See Hen-
dricks, 974 F.2d at 1104-1105. 
297 See Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258. Even for the same exact offense that may be 
closely related in time (December activities versus January activities), the exception 
will not apply. See id. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit becomes more reluctant to apply 
the exception for two offenses that have totally different elements that are necessary 
to prove the respective offenses and that did not arise from the same course of con-
duct. See Hendricks, 974 F.2d at 1104-1105. 
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sons were not identical. 29S As a result, the Ninth Circuit could 
not have suppressed Covarrubias' and Ochoa's incriminating 
statements made to I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez under the time, 
place, and persons test. 
2. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Follow Other Circuits 
The majority of federal circuit courts focus on whether un-
derlying facts are the same for each offense before applying the 
inextricably intertwined exception.299 Thus, only under ex-
tremely narrow circumstances will the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel also attach to other offenses.30o Despite the strong 
presumption against applying the inextricably intertwined ex-
ception and the narrow interpretation of this exception by 
other courts, the Ninth Circuit held that the "continuous 
course of conduct" test controlled.301 Using this broader test, 
the Ninth Circuit implicitly states that the questioning by 
I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez did not constitute a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel violation if confined to one of the preexisting 
tests.302 Instead, the Ninth Circuit should have avoided this 
unruly concept because the circumvention of the Sixth 
Amendment right supplies an independent basis for suppres-
. f.d 303 s10n 0 eVl ence. 
29S 
See genero,lly Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1224-1226. 
299 
See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
300 
See United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 456 (5th Cir. 1993). 
301.. . 
See Umted States v. CovarrubIas, 179 F.3d 1219, 1225-1226 (9th Clr. 1999). The 
Ninth Circuit examined and compared all the facts and circumstances relating to the 
conduct involved, including the identity of the persons involved, the timing, motive, 
and location. See id. 
302 
The preexisting tests are: 1) nulceii of operative fact, United States v. Nocella, 849 
F.2d 33, 38 (lst Cir. 1988); 2) factual predicate test, United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 
33 (4th Cir. 1993); 3) time, place, and persons, United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 
258 (9th Cir. 1992); 4) same course of conduct, United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 
743-44 (5th Cir. 1991); same evidence, United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 
1342-43 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
303 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226 (recognizing that each exception, the inextri-
cably intertwined and circumvention of right exceptions, provides an independent 
basis for suppression of incriminating evidence when the government violated the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
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The Ninth Circuit held that the two offenses involved a con-
tinuous course of conduct such that one offense could not be 
separated from the other.304 However, the Ninth Circuit's "con-
tinuous course of conduct" test is too broad. It is extremely dif-
ficult to determine whether an offense is continuous or com-
pleted to avoid violating the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel. Implementation of the "continuous course of conduct" test 
would effectively prohibit a federal agent from questioning a 
suspect without first determining that that state had not 
charged the suspect with a crime arising out of the same acts. 
Requiring such actions would needlessly frustrate the public's 
interest in investigating new and additional crimes.305 Fur-
thermore, a federal agent will additionally have to determine if 
the offense the defendant- is charged with is a continuing or a 
completed offense before investigating any new offense.306 
The narrow interpretation and application within the Ninth 
Circuit and other circuit courts militates against the finding 
that the inextricably intertwined exception applies in Covarru-
304 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226. The federal crime of transporting an 
illegal alien was a continuing offense as long as the defendants were transporting 
Hernandez. See id. at 1225. The Ninth Circuit explained further that even if the fed-
eral offense had completed, the two offenses involved a continuous course of conduct. 
See id. at 1225-1226. 
305 
See Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1104-1105. The Ninth Circuit found against the appli-
cation of the inextricably intertwined exception, because a broad prophylactic applica-
tion of the Sixth Amendment runs counter to the reasoning of Moulton and McNeil, 
which stressed both the narrow application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
and the importance of allowing police to initiate and pursue investigations. See id. 
Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment does not create a sanctuary for the commission of 
additional crimes during the pendency of an indictment. See United States v. Melgar, 
139 F.3d 1005, 1014-1015 (4th Cir. 1998). 
306 See Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1104-1105. The Ninth Circuit declined to extend the 
inextricably intertwined exception indefinitely because it may prohibit investigation 
on a second crime which may have no relation to the first. See id. It would require 
suppression of a statement given to federal authorities regarding a federal crime if, 
unbeknownst to the federal agents, the suspect had been charged for the same sub-
stantive act at some earlier time. See id. Furthermore, the government would be ham-
pered if they had to check before hand before any investigation began to see if there 
were any pending charges. See Melgar, 139 F.3d at 1014-1015. This requirement, the 
Melgar court found would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in investigating 
new and additional crimes. See id. The Melgar court reasoned that the inextricably 
intertwined exception must be crafted to avoid hampering legitimate, necessary law 
enforcement investigations. See id. 
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bias.307 First, the great weight of authority among those courts 
which have adopted the inextricably intertwined exception 
have narrowly defined the inextricably intertwined 
exception.308 Second, the majority of these courts have spar-
ingly applied the inextricably intertwined exception.309 In con-
trast, the Ninth Circuit went against the majority by applying 
a broader "continuous course of conduct" test. Therefore, the 
Ninth Circuit implicitly states that the facts in Covarrubias 
would have insufficient to satisfy any of the previously existing 
tests. 
a. Time, Place, and Persons Test 
The "time, place and persons" test requires that the time, 
place, and persons be identical for both the charged and the 
subsequent charge in order to suppress incriminating evidence 
under the inextricably intertwined exception.31o If the Ninth 
Circuit adopted the "time, place, and persons" test,311 I.N.S. 
Agent Gonzalez's interrogation would not constitute a violation 
of the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counse1.312 
First, the two charges against Covarrubias and Ochoa did 
not involve the same person.313 Specifically, the kidnapping 
charge involved only Hernandez while six other illegal aliens 
participated in the federal transportation of an illegal alien.314 
307 
See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
308 S id ee . 
309 . 
See supra note 5 and accompanymg text for a list of cases that have acknowl-
edged, but rejected the application of the inextricably intertwined exception. 
310 
See Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258. 
311 See United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-258 (9th Cir. 1992). 
312 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226. The Ninth Circuit side steps the time, 
place, and persons test by arguing that the federal crime of transporting illegal immi-
grants was a continuing offense as long as the defendants were transporting Hernan-
dez. See id. 
313 See id. at 1221. The government argued that transportation of illegal aliens was 
completed when the defendants left Los Angeles and that the state offense did not 
begin until they began holding Hernandez for ransom. Therefore, the time, place, and 
persons all differed. See id. at 1225 n.7. 
314 S id ee . 
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Further, Hernandez was the victim of kidnapping, while the 
United States was the victim of the federal transportation of 
'11 1 l' 315 an 1 ega a len. 
Second, the timing and place also differed.316 The crime of 
transporting illegal aliens began· in California, whereas kid-
napping of Hernandez did not occur until the Covarrubias and 
Ochoa entered Washington.317 As a result, Washington did not 
have jurisdiction to prosecute the alien transportation and the 
federal government did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the 
kidnapping case.31S In addition, Covarrubias and Ochoa vio-
lated the federal law against transporting illegal aliens across 
state borders when Covarrubias and Ochoa departed Los An-
geles, California.319 Thus, the Ninth Circuit would not have 
been able to suppress the incriminating statements based upon 
the "time, place, and persons" test. 
b. Same Course of Conduct Test 
The kidnapping and transportation of illegal aliens did not 
satisfy the inextricably intertwined exception under the "same 
course of conduct" test, which requires that the two offenses 
arise from the same course of conduct.32o Under the "continu-
ous course of conduct" test, the Ninth Circuit focused on the 
fact that the two crimes intersect at only one location, Sun-
315 
See id. at 1225. "The victims of the two crimes are also different: technically the 
United States was the victim of the crime of Transportation of an Illegal Alien. The 
victim in the state kidnapping case was the alien, Martin Hernandez, and his family." 
See Brief for Appellant at 19-20, United States v. Covarrubias, Order Granting in Part 
and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion to Suppress (No. CA-98-30167). 
316 
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225. 
317 
See Appellants' Brief at 18-20, Covarrubias (No. CA-98-30167). 
31S 
See id. at 20. 
319 
See id. at 18. The defendants could have been prosecuted for the federal crime of 
transportation of an illegal alien in the Central District of California, the Northern 
District of California, the District of Oregon, or the Eastern District of Washington 
prior to being charged with kidnapping in Washington. See id. 
320 See id. at 20. See also United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737,743-744 (5th Cir. 
1991). 
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nyside, Washington.321 However, courts generally do not look 
at one point in time but the overall course of conduct in deter-
mining if both offenses arose from the "same course of con-
d t ,,322 uc. 
In United States v. Cooper,323 the Fifth Circuit held that 
when one offense predates the other, the two crimes do not 
arise from the same course of conduct.324 Furthermore, the 
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Walker325 held that even 
though the same evidence may be used for the prosecution of 
both offenses, the inextricably intertwined exception would not 
apply so long as the two offenses involved two distinct types of 
conduct.326 In Walker, the offense of suborning perjury was not 
inextricably intertwined with the possession of firearm offense 
by a convicted felon, one not leading necessarily to the other.327 
Likewise, the crime of transporting illegal aliens and kid-
napping did not arise from the same course of conduct. The 
crime of transporting illegal aliens involved cooperation on the 
part of the person being transferred, while the defendants in 
the kidnapping charge required restraint.328 Thus, though the 
defendants may have had the same motive for each offense,329 
321 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226. The Ninth Circuit found that both crimes 
took place, at least in part, in Sunnyside, Washington because the federal crime of 
transporting illegal immigrants was a continuing offense. See id. 
322 See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 148 F.3d 518, 529-530 (5th Cir. 1998); United 
States V. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737,743-744 (5th Cir. 1991); United States V. Williams, 993 
F.2d 451, 456-457 (5th Cir. 1993); United States V. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740-
741(5th Cir. 1992); United States V. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 776-777 (6th Cir. 1997). 
323 See 942 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1991). 
324 
See id. at 744. 
325 
See 148 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1993). 
326 
See id. at 529-530. 
327 S id ee . 
328 . . 
See Appellants' Bnef at 19, CovarrubUUl (No. CA-98-30167). 
329 . 
See CovarrubUUl, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226. For example, Hernandez probably vol-
untarily entered Covarrubias's van and cooperated with the defendants in the com-
mission of the federal crime of illegally transportation aliens. The defendants did, 
however, had to restrain against Hernandez's will who was allegedly held for ransom 
due to a dispute over payment. 
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the defendant's conduct differed in fulfilling that goal under 
each offense. 
Furthermore, although the two crimes were related in time, 
the purpose behind both differed.330 The purpose of illegally 
transporting Hernandez was to evade immigration laws of the 
United States in return for money.33l In contrast, the purpose 
of the kidnapping was to hold Hernandez for ransom due to a 
dispute over money. 332 Moreover, the federal crime of transpor-
tation of an illegal alien predated the kidnapping offense.333 
Consequently, the two offenses did not arise from the same 
course of conduct. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit would not have 
been able to suppress the incriminating statements based upon 
the "same course of conduct" test. 
c. Factual Predicate Test 
Additionally, the kidnapping and transportation of an ille-
gal alien offenses were not inextricably intertwined under the 
"factual predicate" test.334 The Fourth Circuit in United States 
v. Kidd335 held that even when the defendant is charged with 
the same offense, the inextricably intertwined exception does 
not apply if the factual predicate needed to accomplish each 
crime differs.336 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit suggested 
that the government would have violated Kidd's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel if the sale of cocaine had involved 






See id. at 1221. 
333 
See, e.g., Cooper, 949 F.2d at 743-744 (robbery offense predated firearm offense); 
Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 741(burglary offense predated firearm offense). Similarly, the 
transportation of illegal aliens, which completed when Covarrubias and Ochoa left 
California with the knowing intention to transport an illegal alien, predated the kid-
napping offense which did not begin until the defendants were in Washington. 
334 See United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1993). 
335 
See 12 F.3d 30 (4th Cir. 1993) 
336 
See id. at 34 
337 
See id. at 33. 
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Circuit concluded that the similar drug sale involved new 
criminal activity that was factually distinct from the prior of-
~ 338 lense. 
Similarly, the subsequent crime of kidnapping involved new 
criminal activity.339 The federal offense began when the defen-
dants knowingly transported the illegal aliens out of Califor-
nia, whereas kidnapping did not occur until the defendants 
restrained the victim-alien while holding him for ransom in 
Sunnyside, Washington.34o Further, unlike Kidd, the two of-
fenses were not identical. 341 Hence, the Ninth Circuit would 
not have been able to suppress the incriminating statements 
based upon the "factual predicate" test. 
d. Nucleii of Operative Fact Test 
In addition, the inextricably intertwined exception does not 
apply to the kidnapping and transportation of an illegal alien 
offenses under the "nucleii of operative fact" test.342 The First 
Circuit in United States v. Nocella343 held that two offenses are 
inextricably intertwined if they arise out of a common nucleii 
of operative fact.344 The First Circuit held that if the proof ele-
ments for each offense differ, then the inextricably intertwined 
exception does not apply.345 The First Circuit rejected the ap-
plication of the inextricably intertwined exception because pos-
338 S id ee . 
339 
See Brief for the State at 20, Covarrubias (No. 98-30167). 
340 
See id. 
341 See generally United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999). It 
should be noted that the offenses in Kidd. involved two similar drug offenses, whereas, 
the offenses in Covarrubias involved two different offenses: kidnapping and transpor-
tation of an illegal alien. 
342 
See generally Nocella, 849 F.2d at 37-38. 
343 
See 849 F.2d 33 (lst Cir. 1988). 
344 
See id. at 37-38. 
345 See id. Marijuana and cocaine offenses necessitated disparate proof element, 
and therefore, the inextricably intertwined exception does not apply. See id. 
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session of marijuana and cocaine offenses necessitated dispa-
f I 346 rate proo e ements. 
Similarly, in Covarrubias, the kidnapping and transporta-
tion of illegal aliens charges required disparate elements of 
proof. Specifically, transportation of an illegal alien requires 
that the defendant must knowing or with reckless disregard 
transport or move a person who is not a citizen.347 In contrast, 
kidnapping requires that the defendant must intentionally ab-
duct another person with intent to hold him for ransom or re-
ward, or as a shield or hostage kidnapping.348 Kidnapping does 
not require that the defendant have knowledge or reckless dis-
regard that the person the defendant is holding is not a 
citizen.349 Further, transportation of illegal alien does not re-
quire that the defendant intends to hold the person for ransom, 
reward, shield, or as a hostage.35o In Covarrubias, Hernandez 
voluntarily entered Covarrubias' van and through the joint 
effort between Covarrubias, Hernandez, and Ochoa.351 To-
gether they completed the transportation of an illegal alien 
offense so that Hernandez could remain in the United States.352 
On the other hand, Covarrubias and Ochoa together detained 
Hernandez against his will due to a dispute over a payment.353 
Thus, the crime of kidnapping and transportation of an illegal 
alien did not satisfy the "nucleii of operative fact" test. 
346 
See id. 
347 See 18, U.S.C § 1324(a)(1)(B). The elements of transportation of an illegal alien 
are: the defendant knowingly or with reckless disregard transported or attempted to 
move a person who is not a citizen of the United States in order to help the person 
transported remain in the United States. See id. 








See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221-1222. 
353 S id ee . 
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e. Same Evidence Test 
In United States v. Mitcheltree,354 the Tenth Circuit evalu-
ated whether the two offenses involved the same evidence to 
identify when two offenses are inextricably intertwined.355 The 
Tenth Circuit found that the inextricably intertwined excep-
tion applied, because the incriminating statements obtained by 
the police related directly to both the drug distribution and 
't t . ffi 356 WI ness ampenng 0 enses. 
Similarly, Agent Gonzalez questioned Covarrubias and 
Ochoa regarding both the kidnapping and transportation of 
illegal alien charges.357 However, the Tenth Circuit considered 
"same evidence" with respect to proof elements; it did apply the 
test when the offenses were related in other ways.358 However, 
in Covarrubias, the evidence related to both offenses but were 
not directly linked with regard to proof elements.359 Addition-
ally, the Fifth Circuit stated in United States v. Cooper360 that 
the two offenses are not inextricably intertwined if one offense 
predates the other offense, even if the two cases would utilize 
essentially the same evidence in prosecuting the defendant.361 
For the aforementioned reasons, the evidence did not satisfy 
the Tenth Circuit's definition of the "same evidence" because 
kidnapping and transportation of illegal alien requires dispa-
rate proof elements.362 Hence, the Ninth Circuit would not have 
been able to suppress the incriminating statements based upon 
the "same evidence" test. 
354 
See 940 F.2d 1329 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
355 
See id. at 1344. 
356 
See id. at 1344-1345. 
357 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222 n.2, n.4. 
358 
See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1344-1345. 
359 See Brief for the State at 19-20, Covarrubias (No. 98-30167) (stating that the 
kidnapping offense and transportation of an illegal alien necessitated disparate proof 
elements). 
360 See 949 F.2d 737(5th Cir. 1991). 
361 
See id. at 744. 
362 See 18, U.S.C § 1324(a)(1)(B); Revised Code of Washington 9A.040.020. 
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B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE 
CIRCUMVENTION OF RIGHT EXCEPTION 
53 
The Ninth Circuit should have suppressed the defendants' 
incriminating evidence based upon on the circumvention of 
right exception. Unlike the inextricably intertwined exception, 
the United States Supreme Court expressly endorsed this ex-
ception in Maine v. Moulton.363 A majority of federal circuit and 
state supreme courts have adopted the circumvention of right 
t · . th 3M excep Ion In e same manner. 
For example, in United States v. Mitcheltree,365 the Tenth 
Circuit suppressed statements regarding drug charges al-
though the government purported to investigate witness tam-
pering.366 The Tenth Circuit characterized the interview as a 
knowing circumvention of defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel. 367 Therefore, the right to counsel attached to both 
the charged and uncharged offenses for two reasons.368 First, as 
in Moulton, the police knew that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel attached to defendant's drug charges.369 Second, the 
informant's open-ended questions made it virtually certain 
that the defendant would discuss the details of the pending 
drug charges.37o 
Like Moulton and Mitcheltree, the Ninth Circuit should 
have suppressed the statements based on the circumvention of 
right exception. Agent Gonzalez knew or should have known 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to the 
363 




ee supra note 6 and accompanymg text. 
365 See United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1991). 
366 See id. at 1344-1345. 
367 S id ee . 
368 . 
See Id. 
369 See id. at 1335. 
370 See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1340-1341. 
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defendants' charge of kidnapping.371 In addition, Agent Gon-
zalez asked open-ended questions which were likely to elicit 
incriminating statements regarding the kidnapping charge.372 
Furthermore, Agent Gonzalez did not confine his questions 
solely to the issue of transportation of illegal aliens.373 Moreo-
ver, Agent Gonzalez participated in the planning of the arrest 
of the two defendants as well the arrest itself.374 Finally, the 
state dismissed the state charge in exchange for an alleged 
promise of a federal conviction arising out of the same 
incident.375 Agent Gonzalez deliberately sought to circumvent 
the prohibition of questioning in respect to the kidnapping 
charge by participating in the arrest of Ochoa and Covarrubias 
and asking open-ended questions. 
As in Covarrubias, when evidence indicates that the police 
deliberately sought to circumvent the defendants' Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel protection, the Ninth Circuit 
should have granted Covarrubias' and Ochoa's Motion to Sup-
press based on this exception. 
'VI. CONCLUSION 
The Covarrubias decision illustrates the uncertainty and 
ambiguity of the inextricably intertwined exception. Given that 
most courts have narrowly interpreted and applied the inextri-
cably intertwined exception sparingly,376 the Ninth Circuit in 
Covarrubias improperly applied this exception. As such, the 
Ninth Circuit has added to the confusion between the circuits 
as to which test governs the application of the inextricably in-
371 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222 n.3. Agent Gonzalez argued that he did not in 
fact know that the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to the 
kidnapping crime. See id. However, given Agent Gonzalez's experience, the Ninth 
Circuit imputed knowledge that the defendants' had been arraigned and appointed 
counsel. See id. 
372 . 
See supra note 26 and accompanymg text. 
373 S id ee . 
374 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221. 
375 
See id. at 1222. 
376 . 
See supra note 5 and accompanymg text. 
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tertwined exception. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit should 
have suppressed the defendants' statement based on the cir-
cumvention of right exception. Courts generally have applied 
the circumvention of right exception more broadly on a show-
ing that the government breached its affirmative obligation not 
to circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The facts 
in Covarrubias demonstrate that I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez 
knowingly circumvented Covarrubias and Ochoa's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 377 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit could have suppressed the de-
fendants' incriminating statements relying solely on the cir-
cumvention of right exception because each exception provides 
an independent basis for suppression.378 The court should have 
avoided the issue concerning the split as to which test applies 
for the inextricably intertwined exception. To aid these circuit 
courts, the United States Supreme Court should expressly en-
dorse the inextricably intertwined exception. Should the Court 
decide to endorse the inextricably intertwined exception, the 
Court.must resolve the split as to which test to apply and spell 
out the parameters for when the inextricably intertwined ex-
ception applies. 
377 See supra notes 364-376 and accompanying text. 
378 See id. at 1226 . 
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